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THE FLOW CONTROL OF SOLID WASTE AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE: CARBONE AND ITS PROGENY
JOHN TURNERt

I.

INTRODUCTION

FOR well over a century, the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution' has served as the basis for challenges to local laws that discriminate against the import or export of commodities. Courts have recently been asked to determine the legality of
flow control measures. Flow control laws and regulations seek to
ensure that solid waste or recyclables are directed to one or more
designated facilities. This Comment discusses flow control jurisprudence and describes the standards utilized by courts in evaluating
the legitimacy of local flow control requirements.
II.

THE EFFECT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ON WASTE IMPORT AND

EXPORT

Under the Commerce Clause, 2 states and localities are barred
from imposing or enforcing measures that discriminate against, or

unduly impede protected commerce.A It is now well-established
that the transportation of waste is a protected activity under the
t Divisional Vice-President, Browning-Ferris Industries. J.D., Vanderbilt University (1981); B.S., University of Alabama (1978). Mr. Turner was a panelist at the
Villanova Environmental LawJournal Symposium, Solid Waste in InterstateCommerce:
Federal, State, and Local Roles. This Article develops and refines many of the points
set forth during Mr. Turner's presentation. The opinions expressed in this article
are those of the author.
1. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, d. 3.
2. Id. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." Id.
3. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). Cf Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970). The Court in Pike set forth a balancing test under which the dormant Commerce Clause would be violated by regulations which place upon inter-
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Commerce Clause. 4 The Commerce Clause, by vesting the power
to regulate interstate commerce in Congress, was intended to prevent "economic Balkanization." 5
A state or local measure that discriminates against interstate
commerce either on its face or in practical effect is subject to a
strict standard - the discriminatory measure can survive only if it
serves a legitimate local purpose and is the least discriminatory alternative to achieve local goals. 6 The United States Supreme Court
has also determined that a state or local measure that demonstrates
simple economic protectionism is subject to a "virtually per se rule
of invalidity." 7 Even a measure that does not explicitly or in practical effect discriminate, or fails to evidence economic protectionism,
may be invalid if "the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."8 Alexander Hamilton once warned that, without a unifying constitution
and a federal government devoted to the goal of uniformity, "the
competition of Commerce would be [a] fruitful source of contention....

Each state, or separate confederacy, would pursue a sys-

tem of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would beget
discontent."9 Hamilton's fear was shared by many of the founders,
who drafted a provision during the Constitutional Convention
which granted Congress plenary authority to "regulate Commerce
...

among the several States."1 0 The Commerce Clause is not sim-

state commerce burdens that are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

benefits." Id.
4. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345
(1994); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Fort Gratiot
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353

(1992); Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
5. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
6. Id. at 336. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)("When a state statute ... discriminates against
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further
inquiry."). For a brief review of the standards utilized by courts in examining "dormant" Commerce Clause challenges, see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec,
Free Trade and the Regulatory State. A GA7T's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause,

47 VAND. L. REv. 1401 (1994); Michael E. Smith, State DiscriminationsAgainst Interstate Commerce, 74 CAM.. L. REv. 1203 (1986).
7. Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624.
8. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). When conducting
this analysis, which has become known as the "Pike test," "the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities." Id.
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 116 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3.
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ply an affirmative grant of power, it is also an implicit limitation
upon the power of states to interfere with interstate commerce. As
the United States Supreme Court stated in McLeod v. JE. Delworth
Co.," the "purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area
12
of free trade among the several States."
The Commerce Clause has consistently been viewed as prohibiting state actions which seek to impede the import or export of
waste.' 3 In Fort Gratiot, the United States Supreme Court rejected
Michigan's primary defense that "the Waste Import Restrictions unlike the New Jersey prohibition on the importation of solid waste
do not discriminate against interstate commerce on their face or
in effect because they treat waste from other Michigan counties no
differently than waste from other States."' 4 The Court reasoned
that "our prior cases teach that a State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by
curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State itself."15 The majority concluded that Michigan sought to "authorize each of its 83
counties to isolate itself from the national economy" by "afford[ing] local waste producers complete protection from competi11. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
12. Id. at 330. See also Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much - An
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudenc 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 47, 64-67
(1981) ("free location principle" is at heart of the Commerce Clause); Philip M.
Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An AnalyticalApproach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Claus 39 VAND. L. REv. 879, 882 (1986) ("primary purpose of the Commerce Clause is to foster free trade and prevent commercial wars
among the states").
The notion that states may construct restraints so as to protect their citizens
from the consequences of free access to markets has been repeatedly rejected by
the United States Supreme Court. In such cases, a "virtually per se rule of invalidity" has been erected. Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624.
13. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (affirming Supreme Court's earlier holdings in
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951)); Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid
Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.) (enjoining enforcement of
flow control provision that prohibited export of solid waste generated within
Rhode Island), aff'dper curiam, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991); Alabama v. EPA, 871
F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); Washington State Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (striking down
prohibition on in-state disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated out-ofstate), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir.
1978) (holding unconstitutional statute barring importation of waste from state
without equivalent environmental standards), aff'd on remand, 619 F.2d 871 (10th
Cir. 1980); Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources,
801 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
14. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 361.
15. Id.
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tion from out-of-state waste producers who seek to use local waste
disposal areas. 1 6 The Court also referred to its recent decision,
Wyoming v. Oklahoma,17 in which it concluded that an Oklahoma law
which expressly reserves a segment of the Oklahoma coal market
for Oklahoma-mined coal, to the exclusion of other states, violates
the Commerce Clause even though it sets aside only a small portion
of the Oklahoma coal market. "The volume of commerce affected
measures only the extent of the discrimination; it is of no relevance
to the determination whether a state has discriminated against in18
terstate commerce."
Fort Gratiotwas, in large measure, a test of the present vitality of
the Dean Milk doctrine. In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,19 the
Court dealt with a Madison, Wisconsin ordinance that barred milk
producers from selling milk in that city if the milk was not pasteurized within five miles of the city-center. The five mile limitation
effectively prevented Illinois producers from competing in the
Madison market against local producers.20 The majority declared
that " [i] n thus erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State, Madison
plainly discriminates against interstate commerce." 2 ' In so holding,
the Court deemed it "immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside
the Madison area is subjected to the same proscription as that mov22
ing in interstate commerce."
III.

WASTE FLOW CONTROL REQUIREMENTS"

THE CONTROVERSY

The flow control of solid waste (municipal solid waste and,
more infrequently, recyclables) to designated facilities has precipitated numerous lawsuits and requests for congressional oversight.
Flow control mandates frequently arise through the enactment of
local ordinances that require the delivery by waste haulers of collected materials to one or more designated facilities. 23 A recent
study conducted by the National Economic Research Associates
16. Id. at 361. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (state or

local measure may discriminate "either on its face or in practical effect").
17. 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
18. Id. at 455.
19. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 352.
Id. at 354 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 354 n.4 (citing Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891)).
In Pennsylvania, flow control ordinances have resulted from the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Disposal Act of 1988 (Act 101), PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 4000.100-.1904 (1995), which requires the submission of county
solid waste management plans.
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(NERA) summarized the historical development of flow control
mandates. 2 4 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that "[t] here is no evidence that flow control either positively or negatively impacts the statutorily assured level of
environmental protection, because the underlying regulatory requirements are controlling."2 5 The United States Supreme Court
24. According to NERA's flow control study,
Flow control refers to local laws by which local governments direct
that the municipal solid waste (including residential, commercial, and
industrial) generated within their jurisdictions be disposed of and/or
processed at designated facilities. Local governments have been imposing such controls at least since the early 1970's, principally for two reasons - to protect sizeable investments in waste facilities and to generate
fee revenues to finance solid waste programs. Many local governments
built and/or financed large scale waste management facilities which require substantial minimum waste flows to cover costs. Many of these facilities, for example, are resource recovery plants which operate under
contracts to provide steam for industrial processes and electricity generation. Some of these plants would not be economic without these contracts, and the contracts require that they provide a specific amount of
steam requiring a specific amount of waste. Consequently, local governments need to direct waste to these plants to protect their investments.
In fact, according to the Resource Recovey Yearbook about 48% of the resource recovery plants constructed since 1964 benefit from flow controls.
More recently, local governments have financed and built transfer stations and material recovery facilities. These facilities, especially the latter,
also require substantial waste flows to be economic. Public landfills have
been less reliant on flow controls, although economies of scale may encourage larger facilities. Some local governments also have turned to
flow control to generate fee revenues often used to finance waste management programs such as recycling and household hazardous waste.
Without flow control, waste generators could avoid such fees by turning
to alternative disposal options in other jurisdictions.
Although flow controls have been imposed for over 20 years, they
have only recently become a serious concern as the variety and accessability of alternatives has increased. The private sector responded to rapidly rising disposal costs in the mid-1980s to the early 1990s by building
more disposal capacity. While the number of landfills in the U.S. has
dropped rather dramatically, landfill capacity has not. In fact, capacity
has been increasing in many regions of the country. As a result, disposal
charges are no longer increasing, but rather falling as disposal facilities
compete for business. In addition, the disparity has been exacerbated by
local governments relying on flow control to finance recycling and other
waste management programs. Local governments have imposed fees and
surcharges at flow control facilities. Third, some governments became
more aggressive regarding flow control as waste streams diminished at
least in part because of government regulations and programs. Paper recycling, for example, has eliminated an important fuel stock from resource recovery plants.
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, THE COST OF FLOW CONTROL at

(May 3, 1995) [hereinafter NERA STUDY].
25. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL

2, 5

PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID

WASTE, MUNICIPAL AND SOLID WASTE DIVISION, REPORT TO CONGRESS, FLOW CONTROLS AND MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE 11-6 (March 1995). EPA emphasized that

"[t] here are no data showing that flow controls are essential either for the develop-
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recently invalidated a Clarkstown, New York flow control ordinance
26
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Flow control opponents point out that facility designation requirements are not necessary to ensure that states and localities can
adhere to state-mandated, but not federally required, solid waste
reduction or recycling goals. Moreover, there has been a pronounced increase in disposal and incineration capacity in many areas. Upgrading and expanding of local sites, a revolution in
transportation, and the growth of a transfer station infrastructure
have all led to a competitive market in which a community can contract for long-term disposal at very advantageous rates. Private companies strive to become the low-cost provider in their field.
Municipalities that enter into partnerships with private companies
can enjoy financial benefits and still meet their obligations to
constituents.
Opponents argue, moreover, that the proliferation of flow control requirements has led to an increased number of facilities that
are inefficient and not cost-effective. If every municipality instituted flow control measures and sited its own landfill, recyclery, and
composting facility, there would be a great misallocation of resources and an undesirable environmental outcome. Flow control
measures also often result in a significant "takings" issue, if not in
the constitutional sense, at least from the standpoint of fairness.
This issue can arise in the context of, and affect, both public and
private facilities that are already in existence. When one jurisdiction establishes flow control, other facilities immediately have current and potential customer assets pulled away. Those customer
assets could have been critical to the economic viability of the operation.2 7 Opponents also contend, in light of EPA's findings, that
there is no demonstrated correlation between flow control and en28
vironmentally protective waste disposal, recycling, or processing.
ment of new solid waste capacity or for the long term achievement of State and
local goals for source reduction, reuse and recycling." Id. at ES-5. See also id. at 1213 (identifying several financial and programmatic alternatives to flow control).
26. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
27. Flow control requirements add about $10 per ton or 33% to the average
landfill disposal charge, or "tipping fee," nationwide, about $11.50 per ton or 23%
to the average incinerator disposal charge nationwide, and about $14 per ton or
33% to the average transfer station disposal charge nationwide. NERA STuDy,
supra note 24, at 1-2.
28. Flow control opponents argue that:
[B]y mandating that local waste haulers use particular management facilities, the haulers are prevented from using more environmentally sound
alternatives that may exist elsewhere. The Sierra Club and other environmental groups have rightly pointed out that such regulations often in-
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Flow control proponents, on the other hand, point primarily to
the possibility that municipal bonds may be downgraded if waste
deliveries to flow control-dependent facilities are not sustained.
These proponents have asked Congress to utilize its plenary authority to immunize certain flow control requirements from the reach
29
of the dormant Commerce Clause.
While there are numerous arguments on both sides of the debate, the purpose of this Comment is not to discuss political, envihibit the development of alternative waste management options and, in
some cases, disrupt preexisting waste recovery and recycling efforts. Flow
control laws unnecessarily inhibit the ability of recyclers and other ecological enterpreneurs to compete in the marketplace and provide more
economical waste management options. For that reason, and because
flow control has frequently been used to finance costly and inefficient
incinerators, flow control is opposed by the New York Public Interest Research Group, the National Resources Defense Council, the National
Wildlife Federation, Clean Water Action, and Greenpeace, among others.
Those groups maintain that in practice it is likely that the environmental
costs of flow control outweigh its benefits.

Jonathan H. Adler, The Failure of Flow Contro4 18 REGULATION 11, 13 (1995). See
also Tom Arrandale, The Gold in the Garbage, GOVERNING, Jan. 1996, at 56 ("To the

mavericks' way of thinking, flow control ordinaces amount to desperate measures
by old-guard agencies that cling to the illusion that they can engineer their way out
of solid waste problems .... Rather than make risky capital investments, cities and
counties should develop more flexible strategies that take advantage of an expanding array of private waste-hauling ventures.").
29. S. 534, which would have authorized certain flow control activities and
granted states the ability to limit the acceptance of out-of-state waste, passed the
Senate on a 94-6 vote on May 16, 1995. In the House, however, a limited flow
control-only measure (H. Res. 349) was soundly defeated, 272-149, on Jan. 31,
1996. Congress has, without question, plenary authority over commerce. As one
writer noted, "[t]he [Supreme] Court has repeatedly made it clear that Congress
may limit or overrule the dormant commerce power doctrine in its discretion."
Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a ConstitutionalValue, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 58
(1988). Congress can authorize state measures that would otherwise plainly violate
the terms of the dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). See also White v. Massachusetts Council
of Const. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (1945). In other words, Congress can legitimize an otherwise illegal
activity.
In order for federal law to preclude application of the dormant Commerce
Clause, however, the authorizing language must be "expressly stated" and "unmistakably clear." South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91. The Court has specifically
noted that "the fact that [the State] policy appears to be consistent with the federal
policy - or even that state policy furthers the goals that Congress had in mind is an insufficient indicium of congressional intent." Id. at 83. The Court has further emphasized that only those "[ s ] tate actions that Congress plainly authorizes
are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause." Northeast
Bancorp, 472 U.S. at 174. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S.
331, 340-41 (1982) (explicit "savings" clause did not exempt state law from
Constitution).
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ronmental, or economic concerns, but rather to describe the
manner in which the Commerce Clause has been employed in contested proceedings. Regardless of the outcome of the debate in
Congress, the Commerce Clause continues to act as a barrier to
protectionist, anti-competitive legislation and regulation. This
Comment describes the process that courts should employ in examining claims brought pursuant to the Commerce Clause regarding
flow control mandates.
IV.

FLOW CONTROL DECISIONS BEFORE CARBONE

Before the Court's decision in Carbone, there were strong indications that the Supreme Court would invalidate flow control requirements. Flow control restrictions are difficult to justify in light
of the Court's decisions in Fort Gratiotand Dean Milk. The difficulty
arises since flow control requirements frequently constitute absolute
restrictions on the export or import of waste beyond the boundaries of the city, county, or planning area and, by implication, the
state. Export prohibitions have frequently been condemned by the
Supreme Court, and although the Court has never attempted to
distinguish between import and export prohibitions, it has frequently emphasized that an export restriction is as harmful to com30
merce as an import limitation.
Prohibited export embargoes tend to possess three characteristics: (1) they set restrictions on the basis of state lines or other geographical boundaries; (2) they are designed to improve the
position of a local economic interest; and (3) they have a protectionist effect.3 1 The Supreme Court's pre-Carbonedecisions did not

provide a basis for distinguishing between statewide and county-implemented restrictions on export or import.3 2 Like the ordinance
30. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982)
(restrictions on out-of-state sales of electricity by utility invalidated); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (invalidating ban on export of minnows); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural gas export restrictions struck
down).
31. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1126 (1986).
32. Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 43 (1988).

A local law that favors those within the city or county over those without it, burdens some direct competitors within the same state. The Court
has properly treated these laws as categorically discriminatory and protectionist. These laws have the same tendency toward economic isolation as
a statewide tariff. In theory, competitors outside the city but within the
state provide some political check on protectionism. In practice, however, it is likely that their influence is channeled into creating similar
trade duchies in their own cities or counties. Moreover, all protectionist
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invalidated in Dean Milk and the Michigan waste statute struck
down in Fort Gratiot,flow control requirements - through either a
statewide planning process that imposes flow control mandates or
endorses local requirements or pursuant to city or county-specific
mandates - frequently categorically discriminate against protected
commerce. Flow control measures may provide, expressly or implicitly, that no waste generated within the jurisdiction can be exported, except to the extent specifically tolerated. The mere fact
that the requirement also restricts the flow of waste within the state
or political subdivision is, as the Court noted in Fort Gratiot,simply
33
irrelevant.
legislation benefits only favored classes of locals over outside competitors
or other unorganized groups. There is no reason why cities or other local
governments should be exempted from the antidiscrimination rule because of in-state losers.
The Court's decision in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison illustrates
both the definition of categorical discrimination and its application to
local ordinances. In Dean Milk, a city ordinance did not distinguish on its
face between local and interstate commerce; it burdened all non-local
milk producers, within and without the state. The Court nevertheless
held that it discriminated against interstate commerce. This result was
correct because the ordinance, like a tariff, categorically discriminated
against interstate commerce.
Likewise, the Court has consistently struck down state and local
"drummer" taxes on local agents of outside producers. These did not
facially discriminate against imports, but had precisely the same effect as
tariffs.
Id. at 80-81 (footnotes omitted). Professor Donald H. Regan draws the same conclusion: "A government cannot validate discrimination against a protected class
...simply by subjecting some members of the nonprotected class to the same
burden." Regan, supra note 31, at 1230.
33. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992). As Professor Donald H. Regan noted, in explaining
the Dean Milk decision:
As to the fact that the geographical area does not even begin to approximate the State of Wisconsin, but rather approximates the County of
Dane, and the fact that many Wisconsin milk companies are excluded
from dealing in Madison quite as much as the Illinois company Dean
Milk, [Justice] Clark expressly and rightly says that is irrelevant. A government cannot validate discrimination against a protected class (in this
case non-Wisconsin firms) simply by subjecting some members of the
nonprotected class to the same burden. (A state could not conserve gas
by closing gas stations to all blacks and to whites with odd numbered
license plates.) It also bears mention that if all the cities in Wisconsin did
what Madison has done, then the whole state would be closed in effect to
foreign milk. The entire Wisconsin market would be reserved for Wisconsin processors (and incidentally partitioned among them).
Regan, supra note 31, at 1230 (footnotes omitted). State law occasionally provides
a basis for invalidating restrictions on the import or export of waste. The Tennessee Supreme Court recently held that the state environmental agency lacked specific statutory authority for the imposition of a "service area" limitation, i.e., a
listing of counties that could deliver waste to the facility, in the permit for a solid
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Earlier United States Supreme Court decisions suggested that
the typical flow control requirement was inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. 34 Several lower federal courts, furthermore, had addressed flow control requirements and had invalidated them prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Carbone. The most significant of
the pre-Carbone decisions are Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v.
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp.,3 5 and Waste Systems Corp.
36
v. County of Martin.
In an effort to increase commercial waste volumes at its stateowned landfill, the Central Landfill (CLF), Rhode Island adopted a
regulation that provided that all solid waste originating in, or col37
lected in, Rhode Island must be disposed of at licensed facilities.
The regulation had the effect of preventing the plaintiff hauling
company from taking waste to facilities in Massachusetts and
Maine. 38 Rhode Island attempted to defend the measure by claiming that the regulation did not discriminate because it applied to
both in-state and out-of-state haulers.3 9 In addition, the state argued that a significant in-state burden fell upon generators, who
would pay increased tipping fees at the state's landfill. 4° Significandy, the court ultimately concluded that the measure was unconstitutional because
its immediate purpose and effect [was] to increase
RISWMC's revenues by preventing commercially generwaste landfill. Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. 1995).
34. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 270 (1988)
("Where discrimination is patent ... neither a widespread advantage to in-state
interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be
shown."); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating special
exemption from state liquor tax for locally produced alcoholic beverages, even
though other locally produced beverages were subject to tax); United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 235 n.16 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Commerce Clause entails a substantive policy of
unimpeded interstate commerce that is impermissibly undermined by local protectionism even when intrastate commerce is penalized as well.").
In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Counci4 the majority opinion applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause to invalidate a Camden, New Jersey ordinance that
imposed a resident-hiring preference for government jobs. The Court noted that
an "exemption for all classifications that are less than statewide would provide
States with a simple means of evading the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause." Id. at 218 n.9.
35. 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), aff'd per curiani 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
36. 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).
37. DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 782.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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ated waste from being transported out of Rhode Island for
disposal and requiring instead that it be deposited at the
CLF. The regulation obviously was enacted in response to
statistics revealing a steady decline in the quantity of com41
mercial waste deposited at the CLF since 1987.
The court also found that the only potentially justifiable reason for
the regulation was the state's goal of constructing a waste-to-energy
facility. 42 It concluded, however, that the project was neither guar-

anteed nor financially dependent upon flow control requirements. 43 More importantly, the court reasoned that flow control

was not the "least burdensome" approach to financing and construction. 44 Noting that an absolute ban on importation or exportation is the single greatest indicator of the presence of illegal
45
economic protectionism, the court invalidated the regulation.
In Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, a federal district court
held that "designation" measures (i.e., flow control) adopted by two
Minnesota counties violated the Commerce Clause. 46 The counties, members of a solid waste management board, had developed a
publicly-owned composting facility that was to accommodate all of
the compostable waste generated in the counties. 47 The district
court's opinion was upheld in a brief decision issued by the United
41. Id. at 781.
42. DeVito Trucking, 770 F. Supp. at 785.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992), aff'd 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993). In
Waste Systems, the district court noted that the requirements were "strikingly similar" to the measure invalidated in DeVito. Id. at 644-45. As a result, the district
court, emphasizing that "[t]he Ordinances impose far more than an incidental
burden on interstate commerce," struck down the flow control mandates:
The local purpose of insuring the financial viability of Prairieland
[the composting facility] is not the type of compelling purpose which
permits interference with interstate commerce. Prairieland has expressed an ability to survive regardless of the tipping fee revenue. The
court agrees. As an alternative, the Counties could offer competitive tipping fees to ensure that the necessary waste stream is available. The difference between the market tipping fee and the cost to run the Facility
could be borne by the Counties. As the DeVito court held, "while construction of a [composting facility] may be a legitimate local activity, not
every means of achieving that purpose is therefore legitimate." The
Prairieland Facility may be an improvement in local waste disposal, however, financing that "good idea" on the back of interstate commerce is
improper. Therefore, this court finds the Designation Ordinances are
invalid under the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 645 (citations omitted).
47. Waste Systems, 784 F. Supp. at 642.
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States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 48 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, noting that the Ordinances
failed to regulate even-handedly even though they included an exemption for resource recovery facilities that could be granted only
if "the exclusion would not impair the financial viability of the
[public] Facility." 49 The court stressed that:
The provision regarding application for exemption is illusory. There presently are no resource recovery facilities
within reasonable hauling distance of the Counties that
qualify for exclusion, and the cost of constructing such a
plant is astronomical, as the $8,000,000 price tag of the
Plant demonstrates. As a result, the likelihood that a resource recovery plant would apply for an exclusion is virtually nonexistent. 50
In Container Corp. of Carolina v. Mecklenburg County,5 1 a federal
district court granted an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of
a flow control ordinance in the most populous county in North Carolina. Container Corp. of Carolina (CCC), the landfill operator
challenging the ordinance, argued that the ordinance prevented
CCC from disposing of certain wastes generated in Mecklenburg
County at its landfill in South Carolina. 5 2 CCC demonstrated that it
served over 7,500 residential and commercial customers in Mecklenburg County, and that it dispatched more than 50 trucks to the
area on a daily basis. 55 Additionally, CCC collected roughly 10,000
tons of solid waste per month in Mecklenburg County and its annual revenues from these collection services were in excess of $12
million. 54 The president of the CCC's South Carolina landfill operation testified that it "was 'debatable' whether [the facility] could
stay in business without the ability to receive the solid waste generated in Mecklenburg County, since approximately 50-60% of the

48. 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).

49. Id.
50. Id. at 1387. Commentators argue that Waste Systems was wrongly decided
because the market participant doctrine was applicable; see infra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text. See also Samuel R. Bloom, Note, The Need for a New Dormant
Commerce Clause Test: A Time to DiscardWaste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 18
HAMLINE L. Rv.80 (1994).
51. No. 3:92cv-154-MU, 1995 WL 360185 (W.D.N.C. June 22, 1992).
52. Id. at *11.
53. Id. at *5.
54. Id.
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waste which [the facility] currently receives is generated from
within Mecklenburg County." 55
Citing DeVito and the district court's opinion in Waste Systems,
the court applied the strict scrutiny test, commonly used in Commerce Clause challenges, and concluded that the county failed to
56
show that flow control was the least discriminatory alternative.
An Alabama federal district court also recently invalidated
three municipal flow control ordinances in Waste Recycling, Inc. v.
Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Authority.57 Several of the
plaintiffs demonstrated that before the ordinances became effective, they had either collected or disposed of thousands of tons of
waste at a Florida landfill. 58 Interestingly, two of the plaintiffs
merely alleged that they were in the process of developing a solid
waste facility, in southeast Alabama, that could accept waste which
would otherwise be subject to the flow control requirements. 5 9 The
Waste Recycling court rejected the similar defenses unsuccessfully
raised in DeVito and Waste Systems.60 The Waste Recycling court also
55. Id. at *6.
56. Container Corp., 1995 WL 360185, at *10-11.
In short, it appears the County has failed to prove that there are not
alternative financing methods which would achieve the same goals in a
manner which is less intrusive upon interstate commerce. Rather than
thoroughly investigate and evaluate such alternatives, it appears that the
County simply adopted its Flow Control Ordinance and entered into the
contract with BFI as the most expedient alternative. However, the result
is that this option appears to discriminate against interstate commerce.
Id.
57. 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993), aff'd without opinion, 29 F.3d 641
(11th Cir. 1994).
58. Id. at 1569-70.
59. Id. at 1569. The standing of the plaintiffs was apparently never seriously
questioned.
60. Id. at 1582-83. Specifically, the court held that:
(1) The fact that the ordinances did not specifically discriminate against outof-state delivery of waste was irrelevant. Id. at 1578.
(2) Solid waste was clearly "commerce" within the meaning of the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 1577.
(3) Ordinances that were designed - either due to their wording or otherwise demonstrated by evidence in the record - to assure the economic success of
a facility, infrastructure, or planning entity evidence the type of "economic protectionism" subject to invalidation under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1581.
(4) An ordinance that purported to allow some wastes to be disposed of outof-state imposed restrictions that were "insurmountable." Id. at 1579.
(5) An exemption that "grandfather[s] existing contracts and exempts recycling" was not sufficient to save the ordinances from invalidation. Id. at 1580
(citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 901 (1992) and New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988)). In a footnote, the court noted that it was
convinced that some of the exceptions would not even reduce the scope of the
discrimination. The evidence reflects that the recycling exemption will have little
effect in preserving interstate commerce because of the economic realities of the
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addressed at length the defendants' ill-fated attempt to utilize the
so-called "market participant" Commerce Clause defense. 61 The
recycling business. Recycling is built around an integrated set of operations that
include the collection, transfer, transport, and disposal of solid waste. The flow
control ordinances, however, would dismantle several of these components. Id. at
1580 n.17.
(6) The court determined that the goal of long-term planning was not a defense (citing Philadelphia and DeVito), and that other, less discriminatory, alternatives were available. Id. at 1581.
(7) Citing Wyoming v. Oklahoma, the court rejected the argument that "establishing their own facility will lessen the cities' reliance on others in the area of
waste disposal." Id. at 1582. The court noted - but placed no emphasis upon the fact that then-existing Alabama law generally restricted contracts between cities
and private companies to 3 years, while local governments could enter into contracts with regional solid waste authorities for a period of up to 45 years. Id.
(8) The purported goal of alleviating illegal dumping was never proven and the court cited DeVito for the proposition that the export ban would likely
increase such activity. Id. at 1582.
(9) The requirement, contained in one of the implementing ordinances, that
the title to collected waste be vested to the political subdivision was not sufficient
to remove the ordinance from the reach of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1575. See
Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 S.D.
L. REV. 529, 557 n.264 (1994) (describing Waste Recycling decision and correctly
predicting outcome of Carbone litigation).
61. Waste Recycling, 814 F. Supp. at 1566, 1571. See, e.g.,
White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The reach of
the defense is fully described in Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 404-05 (1989) (defense does not extend to political entity that is market regulator, rather than "participant"), and William L. Kovacs & Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market
Participantsin Solid Waste Disposal Services - FairCompetition or the Destruction of the
Private Sector?, 18 ENVTL. L. 779 (1988) (defense has no application to landfills;
state cannot be both participant and regulator; antitrust-like principles should
limit application of defense). For descriptions of the applicability of the doctrine
to solid waste management, see Paul R. Harper, Note, Solid Waste Transport: Commerce Clause Restrictions and Free Market Incentives, 24 AKRON L. REV. 681 (1991);

Michael P. Healy, The Preemption of State Hazardous and Solid Waste Regulations: The
Dormant Commerce Clause Awakens Once More, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.

177, 202 n.114 (1993) (discussing Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, which
addressed waste acceptance limitations at publicly-owned facility; Healy notes that

Chief Judge Gibbons' dissent described the doctrine as "a peculiar eruption of
Dixieism" and as "states' rights in drag," 883 F.2d 245, 257, 262 (3d Cir. 1989));
Paul S. Kline, Publicly-Owned Landfills and Market Preferences: A Study of the Market
ParticipantDoctrine, 96 DICK. L. REV. 331 (1992). See also KOVACS & PELLIGRINI,
FLOW CONTROL: THE CONTINUING CONFLICT BETWEEN FREE COMPETITION AND MO-

NOPOLY PUBLIC SERVICE, 36-41 (Resource Recovery Report, Dec. 1992); Kenton R.

O'Neil, Comment, "Buy American" Statutes: Should the Market ParticipantDoctrine
Shield Pennsylvania'sSteel Products ProcurementAct From Commerce Clause Scrutiny?, 96
DICK. L. REV. 519 (1992) (expressing concern that broad interpretations of doctrine, particularly in defining "market" in which government is participating,
would allow protectionist actions to escape Commerce Clause scrutiny); Wolf,
supra note 59, at 556-57.
A majority of the commentators argue that the doctrine is ill-founded and
should be abandoned. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Polelle, A Critique of the Market Participant
Exception, 15 WHITTIER L. REv. 647 (1994). The doctrine is favored by those who
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court rejected the defense, noting that the flow control ordinances
"clearly constitute market regulation." 62
contend that the dormant Commerce Clause is not founded on sound constitutional principles and should, itself, be rejected as a basis for judicial scrutiny of
state and local determinations. See, e.g., Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: JudicialActivism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the FederalismMantra, 71 OR.
L. REv. 409 (1992).
62. Waste Recycling, 814 F. Supp. at 1570. The court stated that it:
[N]eed not search deeply to find compelling evidence that the three
cities' claim to the doctrine is meritless - that is, that the cities are not
purchasers... or sellers... or bona fide interest holders in construction
projects .... In signing the user contracts [upon which the ordinances
were based], therefore, the three cities entered the solid waste markets
not to compete for their own individual profit, as would private businesses, but rather they did so to assure the economic success of the Authority. The expressed intent behind these contracts and the three
representative ordinances based on them is not individual market participation but broad market regulation.
Id. at 1572-73.
Several commentators have argued that the market participant doctrine is fatally flawed and should never be applied. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, The State
ProprietaryException to the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Persistent Nineteenth Century
Anomaly, 1984 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 76-77; A. Dan Tarlock, NationalPower, State Resource
Sovereignty and Federalismin the 1980's: Scaling America's Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN.
L. REv. 111, 133 (1983). In The Selfish State and the Market, Professor Gergen noted
that " [t ] he Court has consistently demonstrated its internal divisions regarding the
purpose and scope of the exception: the author of each opinion invoking it...
has dissented in the next." Mark P. Gergen, The Sef'ish State and the Market, 66 TEx.
L. RIEv. 1097, 1153 n.225 (1988) (citations omitted).
No court, furthermore, has upheld a flow control ordinance on the basis of
the doctrine. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
utilized the doctrine to sustain contracts entered into between municipalities with
flow control policies or mandates and private waste collection companies. SSC
Corp. v. Town of Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 911
(1996). See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
First recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 278 (1976), the exception provides that public sector participants in a market can make the same types of decisions as private sector parties
regarding how it will conduct business.
In Hughes, the Court reasoned that
"[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in
the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
The Court upheld a Maryland program that offered a "bounty" for Maryland-titled
automobiles in a manner that benefitted in-state processors. Id. Likewise, in
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the Court applied the exemption to
sustain the ability of a state-owned cement plant to confine its sales to residents of
the state. The Court observed that "the Commerce Clause responds principally to
state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national
marketplace." Id. at 436-37. "There is no indication of a constitutional plan to
limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market." Id. at
437. The Court cited " 'the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer...
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal.'" Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919)).
The exemption has long been applied to sustain deliberate efforts by political
subdivisions to restrict the importation of extraterritorial waste into publicly-owned
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landfills. In County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 14 (Md.
1984), a Maryland court upheld an ordinance that provided that no waste "collected outside the territorial limits of Charles County shall be disposed of in any
Public Trash Disposal Area of Charles County." The court found that the cityowned landfill could properly accept only locally-generated waste, and that the city
did not actually prevent any private party from purchasing land and obtaining necessary permits for the operation of a landfill. Id. In Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of
Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 (D.D.C. 1984), the court sustained a prohibition on the acceptance of extraterritorial waste at a publicly owned landfill, concluding that "no matter the commercial context or the manner of its acting, when
the state itself is merchant or customer," the Commerce Clause does not apply.
The court reasoned that:
The District is expending a public resource, as much so as the money
in its treasury or the services of its police, firefighters and teachers, albeit
upon terms which prefer its citizens over others, and that is precisely what
the Supreme Court has thrice now held that a state is entitled to do without offending the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 1134.
The court in Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1212 (D.R.I.
1987), also held that a public entity could expressly prohibit the acceptance of
extraterritorial waste at its landfill. The court refused to construct a monopoly
exception to the market participant exception, and declared:
While Rhode Island admittedly holds a monopoly in landfill services,
I can see no distinction between this monopoly and the monopoly the
State and its municipalities hold in educational services, or in police and
fire protection. Certainly Rhode Island is not expected to extend these
services to out-of-state residents; the same is true of landfill services.
Id.
County Comm'rs, Shayne Bros., and Lefrancois also unmistakably demonstrate
that a public entity that "has done nothing more than purchase a natural resource.
i.e., the landfill site, and offer to its customers the service of waste processing," id.
at 1211, is entitled to an exemption from the reach of the Commerce Clause.
In a controversial decision, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
acceptability of restrictions that arise during the process of financing a public project. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
The Court approved an order issued by the mayor of Boston that required publicly-funded construction projects to be manned by crews that included city residents. Id. at 214. The Court concluded that Boston's activity was immune from
the Commerce Clause even though the city itself was not actively engaged in the
construction business. Id. It noted that "we think the Commerce Clause does not
require the city to stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract.... Everyone
affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city.' "
Id. at 211 n.7. In other words, the exemption potentially applies even if the public
entity is not providing the product or service, as long as it furnishes the financing.
White was cited with approval by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in a decision that rejected a Commerce Clause claim regarding a generic
contract to facilitate the implementation of an admittedly invalid flow control ordinance. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 502.
Other courts, however, have emphatically rejected the doctrine when the municipality acts as both a regulator and a participant. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic County, 48 F.3d
701, 717 (3d Cir. 1995) ("When a public entity participates in a market, it may sell
and buy what it chooses, to or from whom it chooses, on terms of its choice; its
market participation does not, however, confer upon it the right to use its regulatory power to control the actions of others in that market."). A number of commentators have sharply criticized the rationale of the White holding. See, e.g.,
Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487,
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CARBONS AND THE POST- CARBONE DECISIONS

On May 16, 1994, the United States Supreme Court issued an
opinion that, in broad terms, invalidated flow control. 6 3 Clarkstown, New York, enacted an ordinance that required that all waste
"generated or collected" within the town be disposed of at a designated disposal facility.6 4 The town contracted with a private company to operate the facility and entered into a "put or pay" contract
with an option to purchase the facility after five years for one dollar. 63

C & A Carbone, Inc., another local solid waste processor,

however, had been sending approximately 150 tons of non-recyclable wastes each week from its New York and NewJersey customers
to out-of-state landfills, 66 which were charging $11 per ton less than
the city's designated facility.6 7 The Supreme Court, in a broadly
worded opinion, declared that the flow control requirement vio68
lated the Commerce Clause.
501-08 (1981); Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 66 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1073-75 (1980).
The doctrine should not apply if: (1) the governmental entity actively seeks to
require that waste haulers deliver collected waste to a designated facility; or (2) in
the event that efforts by private parties to develop a private facility were purposefully precluded. In other words, for the exemption to apply, the defendant must
have acted solely as a market participant, rather than as a regulator or as a participant/regulator. Flow control mandates, by their very nature, typically have a regulatory purpose and effect.
63. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
For criticisms of Carbone (and, incidentially, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence), see Laura Gabrysch, Comment, Flow Control Ordinances That Require Disposal
of Trash at a DesignatedFacility Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J.
563 (1995) (arguing for congressional intervention); James C. Vago, Comment,
The UncertainFuture of Flow Control Ordinances: The Last Trash to Clarkstown?, 22 N.
Ky. L. REv. 93 (1995) (same). See also Paul Wake, Note, United States Supreme Court
Strikes Down Municipal Solid Waste low Control Ordinance, 15 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 217 (1995).
64. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1686.
65. Id. at 1680.
66. Id. at 1680-81.
67. Id. at 1699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1680. The Court determined that the ordinance blocked out-ofstate businesses from participating in the local market, creating economic effects
that invoked the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1681. The Court held that although
Clarkstown's protectionist ordinance did not facially propose to regulate interstate
commerce, its clear effect was to totally eliminate competition in the market. The
Court concluded that, "State and local governments may not use their regulatory
power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities." Id. at 1684.
For brief summaries of Carbone,see Bruce J. Parker, Supreme Court Finds Clarkstown Row Control Law Unconstitutiona4WASrE AGE, June 1994, at 21, 24; Martin A.
Schwartz, The Commerce Clause Quartet, 11 TouRo L. REv. 323 (1995).
Commentator reaction has been varied. Philip Weinberg of St.John's University argued that Congress should not exercise its plenary authority over commerce
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Since Carbone, several courts have issued rulings concerning
the validity of flow control mandates. The large portion of these
courts have either permanently or preliminarily prohibited the enforcement of flow control measures. A federal district court in
Ohio issued a temporary restraining order against enforcement of a
flow control requirement in Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Fisher.69 A Pennsylvania court also invalidated a flow control provision in Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Commonwealth.70 In Southcentral Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon
Solid Waste Authority,7 1 a federal court concluded that the defendant's flow control policy discriminated against interstate commerce
and must be judged against the per se invalidity test. A District of
Columbia court, citing Carbone,permanently enjoined the enforcement of a transfer station licensing requirement that effectively ac72
ted as a flow control mandate.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently remanded a decision regarding a New Jersey flow control
mandate. The court noted that as a result of Carboneand the obvious "facial" discrimination caused by the measure, the Pike test was
inapplicable. 73 A New York state court struck down the Village of
Westbury's flow control ordinance in Town of North Hempstead v. Vilto partially overturn Carbone. Philip Weinberg, Congress, The Courts, and Solid Waste
Transport: Good FencesDon't Always Make Good Neighbors, 25 ENVTL. L. 57, 64 (1995).
Kirsten Engel, while not criticial of Carbone,suggested that Congress should employ interstate compacts, fashioned after the highly controversial and difficult to
implement Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, to address the "national market" in solid waste. Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste:
Trade-Offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C.
L. REv. 1481 (1995). William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, on the other hand, argued that Carbone was wrongly decided, noting that Clarkstown's need to centralize
local trash processing was not protectionist in nature, and that the case "involved
what appears to have been a classic allocative measure. The ordinance did discriminate against out-of-state processors, but also against competitors within the locality. It struck Justice Souter, and strikes us, as the sort of lawmaking that need not
be regulated by the Supreme Court." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. Rv. 26, 51-52 (1994). See also Richard J. Roddewig & Glenn C. Sechen, MunicipalSolid Waste: The Uncertain Futureof Flow Control,
A Municipal Perspective,26 URB. LAW. 801, 801 (1994) (broadly criticizing Carboneas
mechanism for "effectively eliminat[ing] the ability of local government to plan for
their solid waste needs").
69. No. C-2-94-493 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994).
70. 645 A.2d 413 (1994) (currently on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court).
71. No. 1:CV-93-1318 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 1995).
72. Perkins v. District of Columbia, No. 94-6736, (D.C. Sup. Ct.July 6, 1994).
73. Atlantic Coast Demolition and Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995).
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lage of Westbuty. 74 A federal court in Georgia issued an injunction
against enforcement of a flow control requirement that adversely
affected in-state facilities. 75 Another Georgia federal court concluded that restrictions on the movement of medical waste between
counties - particularly in the form of a demonstration of need
requirement - was inconsistent with Carbone.76 A Massachusetts
77
district court struck down a Barnstable flow control ordinance.
Similarly, a Pennsylvania federal court invalidated a Mercer County
flow control ordinance. 7 8 Finally, a federal court in Minnesota recently refused to dismiss a claim involving the intrastate transport
of flow-controlled waste. 79
Post-Carbone decisions that have upheld, at least in part, flow
control requirements include Vince Refuse Services, Inc. v. Clark
County Solid Waste Management District,8 0 Delaware County v. Raymond
T Opdenaker & Sons,8 1 Grand CentralSanitation, Inc. v. City of Bethle74. 618 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
75. Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 855 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ga.
1994).
76. Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D.
Ga. 1994).
77. Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, No. 91-13232-DPW (D. Mass.
May 31, 1994). See also Bonollo Rubbish Removal, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 886 F.
Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that Franklin, Massachusetts flow control ordinance was inconsistent with Carbone).
78. Tri-County Indus., Inc. v. County of Mercer, No. 93-592, slip op. at 10
(W.D. Pa. 1994), vacated and remanded sub nom. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of
Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995), cert denied sub nom. Tri-County Indus., Inc. v.
Mercer County, No. 95-1127, 1996 WL 26315 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1996).
79. Ben Oehrleins and Sons and Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 867 F.
Supp. 1430 (D. Minn. 1994). See also NSWMA v. Williams, 877 F. Supp. 1367 (D.
Minn. 1995) (invalidating a Minnesota statute that indirectly promoted flow control). Carboneand its progeny are consistent with the long-held maxim that isolationist or protectionist measures are "impermissible under the Commerce Clause."
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 685 (1981) (Brennan,J.,
concurring). See also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977). The Court has made it unequivocally clear that a finding of protectionist purpose, motivation, or effect is fatal to a statute. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (invalidating Connecticut beer pricing affirmation statute as
"just the kind of competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the
Commerce Clause was meant to preclude"). Statutes which exhibit protectionism
are invalid, even if they neither facially discriminate nor impose, in fact, a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce. See also Bradley v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925); SherwinWilliams Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 857 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
The rule announced in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946), that commerce must remain "free from interference by the States," strongly supports the
conclusion that the measures that directly or indirectly foster the "hoarding" of
waste by political subdivisions are impermissible.
80. No. C-3-93-319, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5008 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 1995).
81. 652 A.2d 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

19

222

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art.
1
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
[Vol.

VII: p. 203

hem, 82 Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester,83 and Waste Management, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County.84 The Delaware County, Grand Central Sanitation,and Harvey
& Harvey decisions were issued before the Third Circuit's ruling in
Atlantic Coast Demolition, and the opinion in Harvey & Harvey was
85
subsequently vacated and remanded by the appellate court.
The decision in Perkins v. District of Columbia8

6

exemplifies the

unmistakable judicial trend in this area. In Perkins, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, applying Carbone, held that an
ordinance which prohibited the operation of private transfer stations violated the Commerce Clause by eliminating private competition in order to control the flow of waste and waste money.8 7 The
court stated that:
Having entered into the open market of commercial waste flow,
the District can not by application of a statute or legislation reserve exclusively to itself, absent a demonstration
that no other means exists to foster a legitimate state interest, which the District has wholly failed to do in this case,
the flow of commercial solid waste in derogation of the
right to engage in such business activities in and out-ofjurisdiction private concerns in a cost effective manner,
which should be inherent in a free and competitive
88
market.
82. No. 94-5928, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15825 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1994).
83. No. 94-3615, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13738 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1994), vacated and remanded, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
84. No. 3-94-0411 (M.D. Tenn. May 17, 1995) (flow control did not create
public monopoly).
85. Adantic Coast Demolition and Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68
F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
86. No. 94-6736 (D.C. Sup. Ct. July 6, 1994).
87. Perkins, No. 94-6736, slip op. at 16.
88. Id. at 17 (emphasis added). The court also concluded that:
By eliminating access to public waste transfer stations by private commercial collectors and haulers and by eliminating, by the force of a statute and related legislation, private waste transfer and processing stations,
through the threat of exorbitant fines, forfeiture of vehicles and criminal
prosecutions, the District has unequivocally required that such private
contractors either use its Lorton facility or other out-of-jurisdiction facilities to dispose of their commercial solid waste without the benefit of the
initial processing step and at an increased cost to the private concerns.... There is no case which this Court has discovered which legitimizes such conduct.
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Carbonealso effectively overruled several earlier decisions.8 9 In
Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Authority,90 a federal
district court had upheld a statewide flow control requirement similar to the Rhode Island ban invalidated in DeVito. Although the
court's reasoning is difficult to follow, Delaware Solid Waste Authority (DSWA) apparently prevailed because the plaintiff misunderstood the burden of proof in Commerce Clause cases. 9 1
Accordingly, DSWA was able to rely upon the legislative findings
92
contained in the state's solid waste management legislation.
Since the case turned on the burden of proof issue, Harvey & Harvey has limited application in subsequent flow control litigation.
Several of the pre-CarboneNewJersey decisions frequently cited
in support of flow control requirements did not directly involve
Commerce Clause claims. 93 In A.A. Mastrangelo,Inc. v. Commissioner
of Department of Environmental Protection,9 4 the plaintiffs challenged
the interdistrict flow control regulations on the basis that: (1) the
regulations were promulgated in violation of the procedural requirements of New Jersey's Solid Waste Management Act;9 5 (2) the

regulations

inappropriately

bypassed

county

decision-making

rights; (3) the state's environmental agency improperly assumed
the power to create waste collection and disposal franchises; and
(4) the flow control regulations were unfairly and irrationally burdensome. Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs failed to convince the New
Jersey Supreme Court to totally invalidate the regulations, although
89. Commerce Clause issues were briefly mentioned in the Hybud antitrust
litigation involving an Akron, Ohio, flow control requirement. Glenwillow Landfill, Inc. v. City of Akron, Ohio, 485 F. Supp. 671 (N.D.Ohio 1979). The plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the requirement had affected or would likely affect any
interstate commerce - and the limited briefing on the subject clearly demonstrated the plaintiff's concentration upon an antitrust argument. Id. at 679.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used Carbone to
justify allowing a plaintiff to overcome an issue preclusion argument regarding the
evidence introduced and arguments made in a preceding state court matter. Valley Disposal, Inc. v. Central Vermont Solid Waste Management Dist., 31 F.3d 89,
102 (2d Cir. 1994). The Superior Court of NewJersey was also influenced by Carbone in determining that no "emergency" existed so as tojustify the redirection of
waste to a designated in-state landfill. In re Emergency Redirection of Solid Waste,
645 A.2d 144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
90. 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985).
91. Id. at 1381. No attempt was made to rebut the assertions set forth by the
defendant in affidavits. Id.
92. Id. at 1380.
93. See Morris County Transfer Station, Inc. v. Frank's Sanitation Serv., Inc.,
617 A.2d 291 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
94. 449 A.2d 516 (N.J. 1982).
95. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-1 to -207 (West 1991).
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portions of the rules were stricken. 96 Since Mastrangelo, the New
Jersey environmental agency has frequently referred to the decision
97
as the basis of its authority to issue flow control directives.
In Borough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,98 the New Jersey Supreme Court examined the legality of an
injunction that permitted certain New Jersey communities to use a
landfill that was nearing capacity, on an "emergency health" basis.
The City of Philadelphia sued, claiming that an injunction was contrary to the Commerce Clause. 99 Although the court concluded
that the Commerce Clause had not been violated, it is important to
note that a true flow control directive was not at issue in Glassboro.
The court did, however, refer to flow control by noting that "state
and local legislators have created the legal expectation that state
and local governments will manage the disposal of solid waste."' 0 0
The court did not determine the validity of flow control requirements in Glassboro, but instead, concluded that the injunction could
"fairly be viewed as a reasonable measure taken to resurrect [the
landfill] for former users that have no other place to dump their
garbage." 10 1 The court also emphasized that states are generally
only permitted to provide in-state preferential treatment in certain
02
circumstances.1
The decision that flow control advocates in New Jersey have
relied upon, in the face of Carbone, is J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.03 In Filiberto, the
10 4
Third Circuit upheld Hunterdon County's flow control plan.
The Filiberto decision essentially rested on two determinations.
First, the plaintiff-hauler failed to demonstrate that interstate commerce (commerce protected by the Commerce Clause) was affected. 05 Second, the court accepted the defendant's arguments
96. Mastrangelo,449 A.2d at 527-28.
97. See, e.g., 25 N.J. Reg. 991, 992 (March 1, 1993) (interdistrict and intradistrict flow control rule) (N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 48:13A-4, in the Department's
view, "merely codifies the Department's authority" recognized in Mastrangelo). See
also In re Certain Amendments to Hudson County Solid Waste Management Plan,
609 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
98. 495 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1985).
99. Id. at 50-51.
100. Id. at 57.
101. Id. at 58.
102. Id. See also City of Elizabeth v. State of NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 486 A.2d 356 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (upholding flow control
requirements).
103. 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988).
104. Id. at 923.
105. Id. at 922.
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that flow control riquirements provide several planning benefits.106
In addition, the Filibertocourt took a position regarding the proper
role of economic benefit - flow control as necessary to provide
economic support to a particular facility or infrastructure - as a
justification for flow control that is diametrically opposed to the
philosophy advanced in DeVito, Waste Systems, and, most importantly,
Carbome. 10 7 The court rejected the application of a line of Commerce Clause cases that applied the "virtual per se" rule against facial discrimination. 0 It noted that "the discrimination prohibited
by these cases was the state's direct interference with the market
either for the purpose or with the effect of favoring home-state interests against out-of-state competitors." 10 9 Significantly, however,
the court also emphasized the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate a
prima facie case." 0
In Filberto, the county asserted several justifications for the flow
control mandate, all of which were accepted by the court in the
absence of any kind of rebuttal."' The county argued that the requirement would reduce truck traffic, provide a long-range planning benefit resulting from a change in the destinations of
exported waste over time, and stabilize in-county operations while
the export operations changed. 112 The court found that these
vague assertions overcame the allegation of illegality."a3 The court
noted that the hauler had failed to show either that the mandate
"effected some discrimination against out-of-state economic interests in order to fall under the per se invalidity [standard] of the
106. Id. Chief among the planning benefits provided by flow control regulation is the financial assurance that a public facility can continue to operate.
107. Filiberto,857 F.2d at 913. The Filiberto panel discussed at length the record developed in the matter. The hauler asserted injury to itself and its customers
because of the doubling of disposal costs effected by the flow control requirement.
The hauler had, before flow control, been bypassing the designated transfer station and had taken wastes directly to the same out-of-sate disposal site that was the

ultimate destination of wastes processed at the transfer station. Id. at 921. See infra
notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 921-22.
109. Id. at 920.
110. Id. at 921. The court noted that:
Filiberto has failed to make a showing that the Rule requiring
processing of trash at the transfer station was protectionist in purpose. It
has rested on the bare allegations of its complaint, while the uncontested
affidavits of the defendants show that the Rule serves numerous legitimate, nonprotectionist purposes.
Id.
111. Id. at 920.
112. Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 920.
113. Id. at 922.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

23

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art.
1
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
[Vol.

226

VII: p. 203

processing cases," or that the requirement was an impermissible in-

cidental burden on interstate commerce. 1" 4 The court reasoned
that since the recipient landfill in Pennsylvania received the same
material with or without the transfer station, the brunt of the "discrimination" was felt in-state in the form of added costs for using
the transfer station in lieu of direct hauling to Pennsylvania.' 1 5 In
finding the flow control requirement to be nondiscriminatory, the
Third Circuit relied upon the well-established maxim of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that the existence of substantial in-state interests harmed by a requirement is a powerful safeguard against legis6
lative discrimination." 1
Filiberto came down to two points, both of which weighed
against the plaintiff and dealt with economic concerns: (1) the
plaintiff wanted to ship waste directly to the out-of-state landfill
without paying transfer station charges; and, (2) the financial success of the transfer station depended upon the flow control requirement. While the plaintiff can certainly be criticized for selecting a
flow control requirement that involved ultimate out-of-state disposal, the bottom line in Filiberto was the court's acceptance of the
premise that financial benefit to the county was an acceptable goal
of flow control. In that regard, it is very difficult to reconcile
Filibertowith Devito, Waste Systems, Fort Gratiot,and Carbone. Indeed,
the view that Carbone implicitly overruled Filiberto was accepted by
most commentators and the Third Circuit in Atlantic Coast Demoli114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id. at 921. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
473 n.17 (1981). Although the Filibertocourt concluded that the hauler had shown
"no cognizable burdens on interstate commerce," it went on to note that the requirement was justified even under the balancing test utilized when a requirement

regulates even-handedly and imposes merely incidental burdens on commerce.
Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 922. The court stressed the economic justification for flow

control:
The local benefits of the Rule are substantial. The transfer station is
the county's only disposal facility. As such it is irreplaceable. As a centralized depository, it is the basis of the county's ability to plan and execute
long- and short-term disposal arrangements. As such, it is indispensable.

On the record before us, there can be no doubt that the transfer station
could not adequately perform these functions without the Rule, and that

the Rule therefore directly promotes the county's effective response to
the crisis in solid waste management.
Id. See also In re Fiorillo Bros. of N.J., Inc., 577 A.2d 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1990), cert. denied, 585 A.2d 371 (1990) (state court challenge by hauler who
wished to take waste directly to out-of-state transfer station; given similarity of facts
to Filiberto, court rejected claim, referring to "the critical importance of waste
stream control" in New Jersey).
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tion & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, in which that
7
court unambiguously determined Filiberto's status."

VI.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT INTERPRETS CARBONE IN ATLANTIC COAST
DEMOLITION

At issue in Atlantic Coast Demolition was the Commerce Clause
standard to be applied in examining the constitutionality of New
Jersey's flow control system. 11

8

Atlantic Coast, a Pennsylvania com-

pany, was licensed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources

19o

to process various types of

20

construction and demolition waste.1 The company unsuccessfully
attempted to be designated as an approved facility in a district waste
12
management plan in order to dispose of wastes in New Jersey. 1
The federal district court, in an opinion issued before Carbone, de117. 48 F.3d 701, 713 n.17 (3d Cir. 1995). The Filiberto decision was troubling, and incorrect, for another reason. Typically, courts in Commerce Clause
cases have permitted plaintiffs to demonstrate "interstate injury" with very little
proof of actual impact. Then, the "strict scrutiny" approach (the "virtual per se"
rule), which applies upon a finding that discrimination exists, thrusts the burden
of proof upon the defendant. In Filiberto, however, the court seemingly placed a
substantial burden upon the plaintiff. Primarily because the waste received at the
transfer station was ultimately from out-of-state, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate economic injury sufficient tojustify a finding of improper protectionism. Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 922. The Court noted that "the
essential [discrimination] question is whether the challenged regulation confers
an advantage upon in-state economic interests- either directly or through imposition
of a burden upon out-of-state interest-vis-a-vis out-of-state competitors." Id. at
919 (emphasis added). The additional costs created by flow control were borne
principally by in-state, rather than out-of-state, interests. Similar arguments were
advanced, and rejected, in DeVito and Waste Systems.
The DeVito court instead utilized much the same arguments to strike down the
Rhode Island flow control requirement. The mandate at issue in DeVito had a negative economic effect on in-state garbage haulers who desired to transport waste
out-of-state, and similarly, negatively impacted Rhode Island commercial and industrial generators of solid waste who had to pay a substantially higher tipping fee
at the state-owned landfill than if they had disposed of the waste in facilities located in Massachusetts and Vermont. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v.
Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 781-82 (D.R.I.
1991). Filiberto, however, during its tenure, did not necessarily present an insurmountable challenge to plaintiffs in flow control cases. Moreover, no other federal circuit, pre-Carbone,suggested that a Filiberto-like analysis was acceptable.
For a pre-Carbone analysis that supports the Filiberto reasoning, see Blair P.
Bremberg & David C. Short, The QuarantineException to the Dormant Commerce Power
Doctrine Revisted: The Importance of Proofs in Solid Waste Management Cases, 21 N.M. L.
REV.63, 86-88 (1990).
118. 48 F.3d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1995).
119. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources is now the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection.
120. Atlantic Coast Demolition, 48 F.3d at 708.
121. Id. at 708-09.
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termined that "the flow control regulations did not impose an un122
constitutional burden on interstate commerce."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, finding that Carbonewas clearly applicable, reversed the district court's
opinion and remanded the case for further findings. 123 The court
found that NewJersey's process of designating facilities "is intended
to favor operators that have facilities already located within, or
124
those that are willing to construct a facility within, the state."
The court emphasized the deficiencies in the state's process of selecting disposal and treatment facilities, noting that the procedure
was not truly open and competitive. Further, the court recognized
that out-of-state facilities were discriminated against due to the
state's avowed goal of ensuring self-sufficiency and the statutory restraint on the selection of an out-of-state facility.1 25 The Third Cir12 6
cuit also overruled the Filiberto decision in a footnote.
Significantly, the court did not determine whether NewJersey's sys122. Id. at 703.
123. Id. at 718. CircuitJudges Stapleton, Alito, and Lewis reasoned that New
Jersey's district-wide flow control regulations were substantially congruent to
Clarkstown's local regulations in Carbone. Id. at 712. The court, furthermore, likened the circumstances in this case to those in Dean Milk where the regulations
permit an out-of-state firm to compete, so long as it builds its facility in-state. Id.
The court also emphatically rejected the argument that New Jersey's flow control
system for the disposal of waste could be upheld pursuant to the market participant doctrine. Id. at 717. See alsoJ.F. Shea Co. v. City of Chicago, 992 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1993); Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990) (doctrine does not apply when defendant
acts, even partially, as regulator to impose requirement upon private party). It is
difficult to square the Third Circuit's reasoning-which is consistent with most
federal circuits-with the Second Circuit's recent rulings dealing with "economic"
flow control and waste hauling contracts.
124. Atlantic Coast Demolition, 48 F.3d at 708.
125. New Jersey law mandates that solid waste districts seeking to utilize an
out-of-state facility must certify to the state environmental agency that there are no
suitable alternatives within the state. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-21 (West 1991).
126. Atlantic CoastDemolition, 48 F.3d at 713 n.17. The courtjustified its determination by noting that the district court correctly relied upon Filiberto,the prevailing law of the circuit, when it made its decision, and thus need not determine
whether the state demonstrated that it had no alternative to its flow control regulations. Id. at 717-18. The court acknowledged that the district court, having considered a substantial amount of testimony and evidence, was in a better position to
address the feasibility of alternative measures. Id. at 718. At the same time, however, the court stated:
We are mindful of the fact that New Jersey has vowed not to abandon its
present system until compelled to do so and of Atlantic Coast's contention that it suffers more irreparable injury with each passing month. ...
After C & A Carbone, the likelihood of success issue is a materially different one from that which the district court previously addressed.
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tern could survive the type of per se scrutiny applicable in
27

Carbone.1

On remand, the district court applied the traditional four-part
standard for evaluating requests for preliminary injunctions, including the "reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation." 128 The court noted that "under the 'heightened scrutiny'
adopted by the Third Circuit, 'the burden falls on the State to
demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local purpose,
and that this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.' "129 Judge Irenas emphasized that the Carbone Court had employed an even stricter form of the test by
"requiring the state to prove 'that it has no other means to advance
a legitimate local interest.' "130 The defendants clearly failed to
31
meet the Carbone"per se invalidity" test.'
The application, by the district court, of the remaining preliminary injunction criteria did not diminish the fact that the court was
convinced, as a result of Carboneand the Third Circuit's ruling, that
"Atlantic Coast has made a strong showing of likelihood of success
on the merits," and the court conditionally granted a preliminary
127. Id. at 718.
128. 893 F. Supp. 301, 307 (D.N.J. 1995) (quoting Acierno v. New Castle
County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994)).
District Judge Irenas granted Atlantic Coast's motion for preliminary injunctive relief conditioned on the court's obtaining further input from the parties.
Additional input would allow NewJersey "to submit a proposed alternative, nondiscriminatory plan to the current waste flow regulations governing the flow of the
type of waste within Atlantic Coast's PaDER [now DEP] permit, along with a study
of the possible impact of the proposed system on the state and the public." Atlantic
Coast, 893 F. Supp. at 312.
129. Id. at 307 (quoting Atlantic Coast Demolition, 48 F.3d at 717).
130. Id. (citing Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1683).
131. Id. at 307-08. The court noted:
Defendants also point to a number of arguably legitimate state interests served by the waste flow regulations, such as avoiding out-of-state
waste disposal liability, financing, inspecting solid waste, maintaining sufficient disposal capacity, waste management planning, and maintaining
incinerators. However, while invited to reopen the record, defendants
have not offered any expert or other testimony to show that no feasible
nondiscriminatory alternatives could adequately serve these goals. Instead, defendants simply state why systems adopted by other states would
not work in New Jersey, and that it is not clear that feasible alternatives
exist to the current scheme. These arguments do not meet the 'onerous'
burden of showing that even the relatively simple [some would say simplistic] alternatives suggested by the Supreme Court in C & A Carbone,
the "unobstructed flow of interstate commerce" and "general taxes or
municipal bonds," would be infeasible alternatives to the current discriminatory regime.
Id. at 308 (citations omitted).
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injunction. 13 2 On November 28, 1995, Judge Irenas issued a pre-

liminary injunction that implemented a New Jersey development
plan for the non-discriminatory inspection of mixed construction/
demolition debris materials destined for either in-state or out-of3
state facilities. '-1
VII.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT REVISITS CARBONE. HARVE

AND

TR-CouAFvz

&HARVEY

INDUSTRIES, INC.

On October 20, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit issued an opinion in consolidated cases that concerned the validity of the Pennsylvania flow control system.13 4 Harvey & Harvey, Inc., a Delaware-based waste hauler, brought suit
against Chester County, the local solid waste authorities, and the
Pennsylvania environmental agency.1 35 Chester County, pursuant
to Pennsylvania law, utilized a competitive bidding process to designate three landfills, including one privately owned site.13 6 The district court, in an opinion issued before Carbone, held that Filiberto
governed, and that, for reasons not expressly stated in the opinion,
the Pike standard was applicable due to the absence of discrimination in purpose or effect.1 37 The district court chastised the plaintiff for failing to introduce "evidence suggesting that the
designation process, had it been used, would have been conducted
in a discriminatory manner," and, in fact, for not taking steps to
ensure that the process would be conducted in a non-discrimina138
tory manner.
132. Atlantic Coast, 893 F. Supp. at 308, 316.
133. 909 F. Supp. 229 (D.NJ. 1995).
134. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
Harvey & Harvey was consolidated with Tri-County Industries, Inc. v. County of
Mercer. See Third Circuit Articulates Review Standard For Challenges to Flow-Control
Initiatives, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1131 (Oct. 27, 1995).
135. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791.
136. Id. at 795.
137. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, No. 94-3615, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13738, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 1994). For further explanation of the Pike
standard, see supra note 3.
138. Id. The court stated, "[t]o the contrary, H & H conceded that it never
participated in Chester County's planning process or attempted to utilize the process described in the ordinance [regarding the alternative disposal sites] to attempt to designation of another facility." Id. The court also concluded, in the
absence of any evidentiary proceeding, that Chester County did not exhibit a protectionist or discriminatory purpose in adopting and enforcing its flow control ordinance. Id. The court pointed to the County's argument that it did not adopt an
ordinance until it became clear that the state agency would not accept the
County's solid waste management plan without a flow control mandate. Id.
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The Third Circuit, however, vacated and remanded the district
court's opinion in Harvey.13 9 In so doing, the court expanded upon
the designation procedure concept articulated in Atlantic Coast Demolition. The court made clear that, particularly, in instances in
which a flow control system is implemented through a procedure
involving the selection or designation of particular facilities (which
may be a mix of public and private sites, in or outside of the city,
county, or state), coupled with an ordinance for enforcement purposes, an analysis of the process in which the system was adopted
and implemented is necessary.' 40 The court emphasized that the
mere fact that an ordinance "requires the use of the selected facility, thus prohibiting the use of non-designated facilities (which may
be out of state), does not itself establish a Commerce Clause violation."' 4 1 The court instead ruled that lower courts should, particularly in examining cases involving site designations or approvals,
"closely examine: (1) the designation process; (2) the duration of
the designation; and (3) the likelihood of an amendment to add
alternative sites, for signs that out-of-state bidders do not in practice
1 42
enjoy equal access to the local market."
Most of the post-Carbone decisions have involved flow control
ordinances in which a local government mandates that waste haulers deliver waste to a single, frequently government-owned or financed, facility. In those cases, the ordinance acts as an export
embargo, prohibiting the delivery of waste to any other facility.
Typically, no competitive, or even nominal, facility selection process
was utilized. The government-owned or financed site was simply
referred to in the ordinance or license. The courts have had little
difficulty applying the per se invalidity rationale of Carbone to those
actions.
Courts have, however, struggled to articulate a coherent approach to flow control resulting from a competitive, or at least publicly-noticed, approach of selecting one or more disposal sites.
Pennsylvania law does not require counties to utilize flow control. 143 Moreover, it "directs the county to use a fair, open and
139. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 791.
140. Id. at 801.
141. Id. at 798.
142. Id. at 801.
143. Id. at 793 (citing 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.102(b) (3) (1995)). Neither
plaintiff in the consolidated cases challenged the facial validity of the Commonwealth's "Act 101" legislation. Nonetheless, the court observed that certain aspects
of the legislation, specifically the reference to flow control as a "necessary" aspect
of solid waste management planning, Harvey, 68 F.3d at 793, and the provision that
states that "[p] roper and adequate processing and disposal of municipal waste gen-
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competitive process" to select its providers. 144 Most Pennsylvania
counties, in implementing the legislation, utilize some form of competitive bidding.
In Ti-County Industries, Inc. v. County of Mercer Pennsylvania,1 45
the district court ruled that a flow control arrangement that resulted from a solid waste management plan which was the subject of
public hearing and resulted in competitive bidding was still unconstitutional. The Third Circuit held that an ordinance which enforces the results of a designation procedure "does not necessarily
violate the dormant Commerce Clause unless out-of-state businesses
146
did not compete on an even playing field for the designation."
erated within a county requires the generating county to give first choice to new
processing and disposal sites located within that county," 53 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 4000.102(a) (6), "resemble policies we found offensive in Atlantic Coast," Harvey,
68 F.3d at 804, and "evidence some intent to favor in-state sites." Id. at 793.
144. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 793 (citing 53 PA. CONS. STAT. 4000.502(f)(2) (1995)).
145. No. 93-592 (W.D. Pa. 1994), vacated and remanded sub nom. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. TriCounty Indus., Inc., No. 95-1127, 1996 WL 26315 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1996). There, the
court noted that the absence of protectionist intent does not end the Commerce
Clause inquiry:
Mercer County has no financial interest in the designated landfill or
its owner. In fact, the landfill is located in a neighboring county. The
absence of a protectionist purpose was the key factor in the court's conclusion after the preliminary injunction hearing that plaintiff had failed
to establish its likelihood of success on the merits of its Commerce Clause
claim. Upon further consideration, however, the court concludes that
the lack of such a purpose does not necessarily preclude a finding that
the ordinance unlawfully discriminates against interstate commerce.
Id. at 4 n.3. Moreover, the Mercer County ordinance, according to the court, did
not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. at 5. Nonetheless, the
court found that the "practical effect of the ordinance is to discriminate against
interstate commerce by precluding the transportation of Mercer County waste to
out-of-state facilities." Id. at 6. Significantly, the court discounted the fact that the
Northwest Sanitary Landfill was not discriminatorily designated by the Authority.
Id. at 8.
The evidence established that the Request for Proposals process was
conducted in an open, fair and competitive manner as required by Act
101. Although no out-of-state facilities ultimately bid on the contract,
bids were solicited by the Mercer County Solid Waste Authority from
across the country. Further, the same specifications applied to in-state
facilities as well as out-of-state facilities. However, defendants' focus on
the manner in which the Request for Proposals process was conducted is
misplaced. It is the designation of a single, in-state landfill, rather than
the process by which it was designated, that has resulted in the discrimination against interstate commerce.
Id. at 8. The Third Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion. The court
recognized it is particularly important in instances in which a designation process
is utilized to determine winners and losers through flow control that the process
and its application be critically reviewed. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 805-07.
146. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 802. The court reasoned that:
While the process in Atlantic Coast clearly favored in state bidders,
not every process used to select a single provider is necessarily infected
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Thus, this court recognized that the existence of a competitive bidding process, which often entails the selection of one or more private facilities or a mix of public and private sites, presents issues
simply compels waste
that do not exist when the local government
14 7
facility.
public
a
utilize
to
haulers
Emphasizing that discrimination "may reside in either purpose
or effect," the Third Circuit acknowledged the difficulty for plaintiffs demonstrating that the designation process favors, either directly or indirectly, in-state service providers, evidence of favoritism,
corruption, specified proximity requirements, incentives to protect
municipal investments, long designation service rights, and the "absence of any real possibility for the designation of additional, potentially out-of-state sites" were among the factors that might
demonstrate impermissible discrimination. 148 The court insisted
that defendants rebut a "putative showing of discrimination" by
presenting substantial evidence that "the designation process was
open, fair, and competitive, i.e., determined by objective criteria
which do not have the effect of favoring in-state interests." 149
with this same parochialism. We believe, in fact, that a local authority
could choose a single provider-without impermissibly discriminating
against interstate commerce-so long as the selection process was open
and competitive and offered truly equal opportunities to in- and out-ofstate businesses.
Id. The court's analysis suggests that it would apply the same standard in examining the constitutionality of flow control that results, not from an ordinance, but
from the operation of a franchise or contract arrangement. Id. at 800.
147. See id. at 802.
148. Id. The court noted:
We recognize the difficulties of ascertaining whether long-term designations are really necessary, and whether the selection criteria are truly
objective. Courts considering flow control schemes where only in-state
facilities are designated must therefore keep this difficulty in mind when
scrutinizing the allegedly discriminatory criteria proferred by challengers.
Admittedly, we cannot cite any authority for the sort of inquiry we describe, but this area of law is nascent, and we are constrained to draw
upon notions of reasonableness to effectuate the relevant policies.
Id.
149. Id. at 802-03. The court noted that:
Such evidence might include bid solicitation, selection criteria, evaluation of bidders, et alia, but such evidence alone might be insufficient to
provide the flow control scheme's neutrality. The government defendants in these cases might also present additional evidence, such as statistical evidence or expert testimony, demonstrating that different aspects of
the designation process are as neutral to out-of-state interests as they appear on their face.
Id. at 803. The court's reasoning was employed in Barker Brothers Waste, Inc. v. Dyer
County Legislative Body, No. 95-2942 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 16, 1996), to dismiss a complaint brought by an unsuccessful bidder. The court concluded that the plaintiff
had presented no evidence of discriminatory motive, noting that "[a] number of
consdierations favored the BF1 (the successful bidder) proposal. BFI promised
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Although the Third Circuit did not invalidate the Chester
County system in Harvey & Harvey, given the district court's application of a repudiated standard of review, it emphasized that "the current record creates the strong impression that the Chester County
process was not sufficiently open, and that there was no real potential for amendment that could offer out-of-state bidders a fair
chance at Chester County's business." 150 The court referred to several criteria including: the legislative history of the solid waste management plan, the apparent intention of planning agents to ensure
that in-county facilities were selected, the strong economic incentive for the county to retain waste volumes at a site owned by the
county, the absence of any meaningful public notification process
regarding the selection of disposal facilities, the selection of a private alternative facility long after the bidding process was concluded, and the significant restrictions upon selection of additional
alternative disposal sites as strong evidence of "home cooking."' 5 '
Additionally, the court pointed to landfill financing documents, in
which the county agreed to maintain the existing plan without reducing the county's service area or restricting the definition of municipal waste, to support its belief that the flow control system was
52
designed and implemented to preclude a "level playing field."'
Utilizing this same approach, the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's opinion in Tri-County Industries, declaring that a "further development" of the record was necessary to
justify a finding of discrimination. 53 Despite an incomplete record, the court acknowledged the possibility that the selection of a
single privately-owned site through the Pennsylvania Act 101
jobs for the county and promised to open an office in the County; Barker Brothers
apparently intended to operate out of its Union City headquarters. Id. BFI offered
a sophisticated educational curriculum including teaching materials, a neighborhood watch program to accompany its hauling service, and an impressive recycling
program. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, BFI offered a clean environmental record. While the nature and number of any violations by Barker Brothers and
the Northwest Tennessee landfill are not before the court, it is clear that those
violations were of concern to the Legislative Body on September 11." Id.
150. Id. at 803 (footnote omitted). The court observed that "[i]t is true that
one cannot draw any inferences about the equity of the designation process from
its description in the Chester ordinance." Id. However, the court stated that portions of the solid waste management plan indicated that the county intended to
maintain the waste disposal business in the county. Id. at 805. "We believe that the
County's economic interest in keeping the business at home and the Plan's legislative history . ..suggest that the designation process did not offer a level playing
field." Id.
151. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 806.
152. Id. at 807.
153. Id.
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designation process could have resulted from in-state prejudice. 15 4
While Mercer County advertised its request for bids nationwide and
furnished specifications to over twenty companies (including landfill operators as far away as Louisiana), only four companies submitted bids.1 5 5 "That a number of out-of-state companies requested
the [Request for Proposals (RFP)] package but not a single out-ofthat some aspect of
state interest submitted a bid raises the concern
1' 5 6
interests.'
state
of
out
the RFP discouraged
In addition, certain aspects of the planning process were ap15 7
parently not conducted pursuant to a truly participatory process.
The Third Circuit noted that the selection scheme would be "less
problematic if a realistic opportunity existed for an out-of-state
landfill to compete for at least some of the county's business within
a reasonable period." 5 8 Due to the absence of this opportunity for
out-of-state landfills in the Mercer County scheme, the court found
that "[t]he designation of the site in this case . . . effectively
amounts to the grant of a monopoly for the period of the designation." 159 The Third Circuit instructed the district court to examine
whether the contracted tipping (disposal) fee "was so high" relative
to the spot market or the rate that the parties "would [otherwise]
be willing to fix for the entire period" that "it would suggest an
attempt to confer some extraordinary, super-monopolisitic profit
160
on the chosen landfill operator."
The Third Circuit's opinion in the consolidated Harvey & Harvey cases illustrates the court's unwillingess to invalidate all flow
control systems that result from a designation or competitive selection process. On the other hand, the criteria developed by the
court demonstrate the difficulties faced by local governments in attempting to justify schemes that were, through design or implementation and effect, efforts to promote in-state economic actors while
16 1
disadvantaging out-of-state parties.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 808.
156. Harvey, 68 F.3d at 808.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 809. According to the court, "realistic opportunities" include the
possibility of an amendment to designate an additional site and a shorter contract
duration. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. In a discussion of flow control decisions rendered by the other federal
circuits, the majority opinion referred to Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994). See Harvey, 68 F.3d at 801. The
opinion characterized Blue Circle as having "upheld flow control ordinances." Id.
In fact, Blue Circle did not involve any form of flow control mandate. At issue was
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APPLICATION OF CARBOA'E TO "ECONOMIC FLOW CONTROL"

Recent decisions have suggested that certain "economic flow
control" measures (i.e., when the community lowers the tipping fee
at the public landfill and institutes a "generator fee" or user fee to
make up for the potential revenue loss) may be unconstitutional. In
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,162 the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a Massachusetts regulation that imposed a tax on
all milk sold within the Commonwealth. A subsidy program was
established which rebated the tax payments from a special fund for
distribution to in-state milk producers based on their overall share
of total milk production.163 Companies that did not process milk
within Massachusetts did not receive a rebate or subsidy, even
though they were subject to the tax. 164 The Court noted that " [t]he
paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against interstate
commerce is the protective tariff or customs duty, which taxes
goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in State."1 6 5 It stressed that such measures "are so
patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt
by any State to enact one. 166 Instead, the court noted, the cases
usually involve state laws that invoke more subtle means of providthe constitutionality of a local zoning ordinance that was interpreted to require a
conditional use permit for the construction of a hazardous waste-burning cement
kiln. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d at 1502. The ordinance did not seek to restrict the market
area served by particular facilities or to ensure that waste generated in the community was treated or disposed of at a designated site. The court noted that the ordinance did not distinguish between hazardous waste based on the place of
generation. Id. at 1511-12. Consequently, particularly in light of the absence of
any evidence of discriminatory intent, the court applied the Pike balancing test and
ultimately rejected the Commerce Clause claim. Id. at 1512. Blue Circle is an example of the numerous decisions that have addressed measures that purportedly seek
to restrict the siting or operation of facilities that would receive extra-territorial

waste.
For an example of a recent, sweeping determination regarding West Virginia
measures that essentially sought to restrict importation of out-of-state solid waste,
including sewage sludges, see Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Callaghan, No.
5:93CV189, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17490 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 28, 1995) (enjoining
enforcement of entire environmental statutes due to legislative history, provisions
that imposed low monthly tonnage limits on sewage sludge acceptance, and fees
imposed on out-of-"shed" waste, all of which establish evidence of protectionist
intent and discrimination in practical effect). For a discussion of the Chester
County flow control controversy, see Susan Q. Stranahan, Now, It Seems Trash Is
Worth Fighting Over, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 10, 1995 at El.
162. 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
163. Id. at 2210.
164. Id. at 2212.

165. Id. at 2211.
166. Id. at 2212.
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ing the benefits of tariffs.1 67 The Court concluded that a rebate or
those impermissible alternasubsidy to in-state processors is one of
16 8
states.
by
advanced
tives occasionally
Similarly, "economic flow control" subsidies could run afoul of
the principles set forth by the Court in West Lynn Creamery. Carbone
has already led to an increased willingness by courts to question
economic subsidies affecting waste materials. In Mid-American Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Fisher,169 a federal district court granted a temporary
restraining order against enforcement of a $49 per ton "generation
fee." The fee was specifically intended to avoid the reach of Carbone
through an "economic flow control" arrangement. 70 As a result of
this decision, the parties reached an out-of-court compromise
which eliminated the disputed fee. 17 1 The court concluded that
167. West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2212. A federal district court cited West
Lynn Creamery for the additional proposition that "non-integrated statutes can be
unconstitutional as [an overall] scheme even if they are separately constitutional."
WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (W.D. Va. 1994),
aff'd, 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995) (regarding constitutionality of several statutes
that purportedly restricted hostile takeover attempts in Virginia). See also National
Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1995) (referring to Carbone and West Lynn Creamery as examples of decisions utilizing the
"per se" analysis to invalidate "laws that explicitly discriminate against interstate
commerce").
168. West Lynn Creamery, 114 S. Ct. at 2212.
169. No. C-2-94-493, slip op. (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994).
170. Id. at 9. The Solid Waste Authority of Central Ohio (SWACO), by a resolution, established a "generation fee on all in-district generated solid wastes of
forty-nine dollars per ton, with disposal rates at SWACO's facilities of $0.00 per
ton, and tipping fees at SWACO's three in-district solid waste transfer stations of
$0.00, $0.00 and five dollars per ton." Id. at 3. The resolution specifically authorized transport of materials to out-of-state facilities. Id. The court, in preventing
the implementation of the fee, noted that:
[T] he economic effect of resolution 53-94 eliminates competition by
other waste disposal or processing facilities that desire to receive waste indistrict. The $49 generation fee, in and of itself, does not offend the
Commerce Clause. The generation fee, however, is used to artificially
lower the fees for tipping and disposal. The net result effectively eliminates competition by anyone who would seek to provide disposal services
for in-district generated wastes at a facility within the state. The provision
of such services in competition with SWACO comes within the ambit of
interstate commerce.
Id. at 9. See also Sanifill, Inc. v. Kandiyohi County, Minnesota, No. C4-95-1363, slip
op. at 17 (Kandiyohi County 8th Jud. Dist. Feb. 8, 1996) (finding that a "waste
management service fee," which "is used to subsidize the county-owned landfill,
thus enabling the landfill to artifically lower its Facility Fee," id. at 10, was purposely designed to "impede the interstate competition posed by the Plaintiff.").
"Once the garbage has been collected by the hauler, the lower tip fee at the
County landfill, made possible by a subsidy from the service fee, renders other
landfills uncompetitive, essentially forcing all haulers to either utilize the services
of the County landfill or incur higher total costs due to transportation expenses
and/or higher tip fees at other facilities." Id. at 18.
171. Id.
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the fee did not deliberately seek to restrict interstate commerce, or
otherwise direct waste to certain facilities, but was nonetheless im172
permissible because it acted as an economic subsidy.
173
The Second Circuit, in USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,
reached a contrary result based on an elaborate discussion of the
factual background. Under a service agreement, the hauler (the
town had contracted waste collection services to a single vendor)
was allowed to dispose of the waste it collected free of charge, as
long as it did so only at the designated incinerator.17 4 The cost of
disposal was comprised of a mandatory annual user fee of $1,500
per parcel of commercial property and a "user charge" for amounts
generated in excess of a base amount.1 75 The court characterized
the taxing scheme as non-discriminatory because, unlike West Lynn
Creamery, Babylon's financing scheme did not subsidize either the
contract hauler or the private operator of the incinerator. 76 The
Second Circuit determined:
Instead, the Town spends its tax revenues to purchase
services for town residents - a traditional, and unexceptionable, municipal activity. Babylon buys garbage collection services from BSSCI and incinerating services from
Ogden.

Nor . . . does the town subsidize [the waste

hauler] by letting it dump town garbage for 'free' at the
Incinerator; rather, the Town pays less to [the hauler] in
the first place for collecting garbage because [the hauler]
does not have to pay for garbage disposal. If anyone is
'subsidized' by the user fees, it is the municipal treasurynot any private business. And that, of course, is the point
1 77
of every tax.
172. Id.
173. 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995).
174. Id. at 1276.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1292. See Eric S. Peterson & David N. Abramowitz, Second Circuit
Decisions Uphold low Control Systems, U.S. MAYOR, Nov. 6, 1995, at S-4.
177. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1292. The court further noted that:
[A]lthough we agree that the Town's tax system constitutes "regulation," we disagree that it has any discriminatory effect, or that it impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. To the contrary, we believe that
the Town of Babylon has taken to heart the Supreme Court's admonition
in Carbone that if "special financing is necessary to ensure the long-term
survival" of the incinerator, then "the town may subsidize the facility
through general taxes or municipal bonds." Babylon has employed both
taxes and bonds. It levies a $1500 flat tax on all improved commercial
properties in the district, as well as a "user fee" for each cubic yard of
garbage generated on each parcel above a fixed base amount. We believe
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To the extent that subsequent courts view USA Recycling as establishing an axiomatic rule that precludes Commerce Clause challenges of taxes or fees used to promote the facility, the possibility
that West Lynn Creamerystands in the way of "economic flow control"
is substantially reduced. 7 8 It is, however, more likely that courts
may be willing, particularly in instances in which there is evidence
of discriminatory motivation, to invalidate fees and surcharges that
were created for the specific purpose of ensuring that collected
waste be directed to a designated facility. Courts have traditionally
invalidated measures, using a per se invalidity approach, that have
the practical effect of "hoarding" commodities. The courts have
also placed particular emphasis upon ensuring that fees and taxes
do not impede commerce. 179 The Supreme Court's rulings in the
tax cases are consistent with a long line of decisions that have held
that both of these fees qualify as the sort of taxes the Supreme Court had
in mind in Carbone.
Id. (citations omitted).
The court likewise rejected the notion that the arrangement for the contract
hauler to "dump town garbage at the Incinerator for free" was an unlawful subsidy:
Although a customer normally pays its garbage hauler for two services, collection and disposal, Babylon has purchased those services separately. The Town pays BSSCI to collect town garbage, and Ogden to
incinerate it. If Babylon had so desired, it could have charged BSSCI
"tipping fees" to dump town trash at the Incinerator-as the neighboring
town of Smithtown has done. By charging fees at the Incinerator, the
Town could eliminate its hauler's arguable incentive to insinuate noncontract garbage into the garbage it dumps for free at the Incinerator.
But if BSSCI had to pay to dispose of town garbage, it would have passed
those costs back to Babylon in a higher bid. The Town therefore saves
money in its contract with BSSCI by letting it dump for free at the Incinerator. The disposal component of the contract is therefore a wash - not
a subsidy -

for BSSCI.

Id. at 1289-90 (citations omitted).
178. Of course, even if no Commerce Clause issues are implicated, there may
be questions raised pursuant to other local, state, or federal provisions. For example, shortly after the Second Circuit ruling, a state court invalidated the resolutions
that created the Babylon commercial refuse districts on the ground that the city, in
violation of local law, failed to hold a public hearing. Eads St. Corp. v. Town of
Babylon, 631 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
179. In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court invalidated taxes
or fees on waste. In Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334
(1992), the Court specifically invalidated a tax that adversely affected interstate
commerce. The State of Alabama had adopted a disposal fee of $25.60 per ton for
in-state generated hazardous waste, and a $72 per ton fee for imported waste. Id.
at 338-39. When the statute went into effect in 1990, the volume of hazardous
waste disposed of at Chemical Waste's Emelle facility decreased from 791,000 tons
in 1989 to 290,000 tons in 1991. Id. at 342 n.4. The Court held that, since the
imported waste was physically indistinguishable from in-state wastes, the Alabama
statute discriminated against imported waste in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 344. Justice White's majority opinion for the Court noted that the State
could have instead imposed one or more of several nondiscriminatory options,
such as a generally applicable per-ton fee on all waste disposed of within Alabama,
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a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting waste across Alabama roads, or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle. Id. at 344-45.
In a subsequent decision, the United States Supreme Court invalidated an
Oregon differential fee that was specifically designed to pass constitutional muster.
Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S.Ct. 1345 (1994).
The State of Oregon imposed an in-state waste disposal tax of $.85 per ton, and a
tax on imported solid waste of $2.25 per ton. Id. at 1348. The Court, in striking
down the tax in spite of the justifications advanced by the state, noted that the tax
was essentially identical to the measure invalidated in Chemical Waste. Id. at 1350.
Economic and environmental regulatory measures may violate the Commerce
Clause for another reason. It is clear that a state may not seek to extend its jurisdiction to out-of-state parties. One of the cardinal principles set forth in the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that state requirements may
not directly regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co.,
268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925). The Court has consistently defined "direct regulation"
as regulation that has the practical effect of attempting to control the conduct of
other states. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982).
The Court explicitly struck down an "extraterritorial" state statute as a direct
regulation of interstate commerce in Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). A New York law required that liquor distillers
who sold to New York wholesalers "affirm" that the prices charged were no higher
than those assessed in other states. Id. at 575. The Court declared that "[w]hile
New York may regulate the sale of liquor within its borders ....it may not 'project
its legislation into [other states] by regulating the price' to be paid for liquor in
those states." Id. at 582-83 (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521
(1935)). The breadth of the ruling is fairly remarkable, considering that the requirement addressed only in-state sales. Id. at 575. The Court reasoned that the
"direct regulation" test was applicable because the mandate had the "practical effect" of controlling the price of liquor in other states. Id. at 583.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), moreover, the Court invalidated
an Illinois statute that granted state officials the power to delay corporate acquisitions of companies with certain Illinois ties, and to block so-called "inequitable"
tender offers. The Court, in striking down the provision, concluded that it impermissibly sought to regulate tender offers on a national basis. Id. at 641. Similarly,
the Seventh Circuit recently remanded a decision upholding Wisconsin's "effective
recycling program" statute, finding that the law (which prohibited importation of
waste from out-of-state communities that failed to adopt recycling programs approved by the Wisconsin agency) impermissibly directly regulated commerce. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995)
(citing, at note 9, Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
965 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court has invalidated state
statutes where a state has 'projected' its legislation into other states and directly
regulated commerce therein, thereby either forcing individuals to abandon commerce in other states or forcing other states to alter their regulations to conform
with the conflicting legislation."), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 602 (1992)). See also Cotto
Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1995) (per se test applicable to
invalidate extraterritorial regulation that "has the practical effect of controlling
conduct beyond the boundaries of the state"); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer
Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 824 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting "extraterritoriality" was
factor in per se analysis but finding doctrine inapplicable in case involving New
Jersey Franchise Practices Act since "it is the parties' own agreement [rather than
the statute] which operated to project the New Jersey law outside of New Jersey's
borders" pursuant to choice-of-law analysis).
In Connecticut Carting Co. v. Town of East Lyme, No. 3:95CV1493, - WL (D.Conn. Dec. 14, 1995) the court concluded that a mandatory per-ton fee assessed against waste haulers, in order to support a put-or-pay agreement between
the municipality and the operator of a waste to energy facility, was an unconstitu-
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that discrimination, however slight, against interstate commerce
180
will not be tolerated.
In the so-called "drummer" cases, the United States Supreme
Court did not hesitate to invalidate seemingly "local" fees and taxes
because of their impact on protected commerce. In Robbins v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby County, Tenn., 181 for example, the Court invalidated a "drummers" license tax. The tax applied to all salesmen
who sold by use of samples and who did not have a licensed place of
business in the county.' 8 2 Although the measure applied equally to
all out-of-county and out-of-state "drummers," the Court found that
interstate interests were affected. In Best & Co. v. Maxwell,1 83 the
Court struck down a $250 "privilege tax" on "drummers." The tax
applied to all non-resident itinerant sellers.18 4 In its practical effect,
however, the tax discriminated against out-of-state sellers.1 8 5 The
Court noted that "[t] he Commerce Clause forbids discrimination,
whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its name may be,
will in its practical operation work discrimination against interstate
commerce." 18 6 Similarly, in Nippert v. Richmond,'8 7 an annual tax
imposed on all those "engaged in business as solicitors" was detional form of "economic flow control." The fee was imposed after Carbone rendered inoperable a flow control ordinance. The town had engaged in "economic
flow control" by simply converting the prior disposal charge to a tonnage fee that
was calculated on the basis of the amount of waste collected by the hauler. The
hauler was not obligated to deliver the waste to the preferred facility, but had no
practical alternative given that it could utilize the facility at no extra charge. In
order to dispose of its waste at another site, the hauler would have to pay both the
town's tonnage fee and the disposal charge assessed by the alternative facility. The

court reasoned that:
By setting the fee to cover the cost to the town of disposal at [the facility]

the hauler pays a fee equal to a tipping fee. The hauler must then choose
to use the Preston facility or pay an additional fee for disposal at another
site. Adding the town's fee to the cost of using other facilities discourages
their use because it is cost prohibitive.
Id. (unpublished decision is on file with the Villanova Environmental Law
Journal).
180. See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)
("Where discrimination is patent... neither a widespread advantage to in-state
interests nor a wide-spread disadvantage to out-of-state competitors need be
shown"); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating a special
exemption from a state liquor tax for locally produced alcoholic beverages, even
though other locally produced beverages were subject to the tax).

181. 120 U.S. 489 (1877).
182. Id. at 490-91.
183. 311 U.S. 454 (1940).

184.
1-85.
186.
187.

Id. at 455.
Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 455-56.
327 U.S. 416 (1946).
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The Court found that out-of-state sellers

would be burdened, particularly due to the risk of multiple
89
taxation. 1
In several additional instances, the Court has invalidated seemingly local restrictions in light of the concern that such restrictions
could proliferate and "balkanize" commerce. In Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank,190 a federal district court invalidated a
local ordinance which imposed restrictions on air traffic at a privately owned airport. The court emphasized that "l[c] onsidered singly, such an Ordinance might not impose an unlawful interference
with interstate commerce in all cases. However, considered on a
national level, the Ordinance could not stand." 19 1
188. Id. at 418.
189. Id. at 429. The Court reasoned that:
It is no answer ...that the tax is neither prohibitive nor discriminatory on the face of the ordinance; or that it applies to all local distributors
doing business as appellant has done. Not the tax in a vacuum of words,
but its practical consequences for the doing of interstate commerce in
applications to concrete facts are our concern. To ignore the variations
in effect which follow from application of the tax, uniform on the face of
the ordinance, to highly different fact situations is only to ignore those
practical consequences.
Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).
190. 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 411 U.S. 624
(1973).
191. Id. at 927. It is important to note that in at least seven recent decisions,
courts have enjoined, invalidated, or subjected to the per se invalidity test flow
control or related measures that affected landfills or waste haulers who handled
intrastate, as opposed to interstate, waste shipments. See Mid-American Waste Sys.,
Inc. v. Fisher, No. C-2-94-493 (S.D. Ohio May 13, 1994); Southcentral Pennsylvania
Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., 877 F.
Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Waste Disposal, Inc. and New England Ecological Dev.,
Inc. v. The Town of Barnstable, CA. No. 91-13231-DPW (D. Mass. May 31, 1994);
Environmental Waste Reductions, Inc. v. Reheis, 887 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga.
1995); Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Town of Gray, 632 A.2d 134 (Me. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2099 (1994); Citizens for Logical Alternatives (C.LA.R.E.) v. Clare
County Board of Comm'rs, 536 N.W.2d 286 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Waste Recovery Coop. of Minnesota v. County of Hennepin, 504 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993), rev'd on other grounds, 517 N.W.2d 329 (Minn. 1994). See also Ben Oehrleins
& Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, Minn., CA. No. 4-94-63 (D. Minn.
Mar. 28, 1996); Poor Richard's, Inc. v. Ramsey County, Minn., CA. No. 4-95-306
(D. Minn. Mar. 28, 1996) (invalidating local ordinances that were interpreted to
require flow control of waste destined for in-state disposal or processing).
These decisions, along with Commerce Clause rulings such as Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946), signal the broad reach of the Commerce Clause and
suggest that a wide variety of flow control measures may be subject to judicial invalidation. See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (conspiracy
regarding operating privileges for surgeon affected interstate commerce because:
(1) some procedures were performed on out-of-state residents, and (2) some
medications and supplies were purchased from out-of-state); F.T.C. v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (agreement to set fees for local title searches affected
interstate commerce, so that Sherman Act was applicable); McLain v. Real Estate
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The United States Supreme Court has established that protectionistic practices can be manifested by legislative means or legislative ends, so that even a presumably legitimate goal cannot be
accomplished "by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from
the national economy."1 92 The Court's decision in Carboneis consistent with the long-held maxim that isolationist or protectionist
measures, including actions that illustrate a protectionist intent or
purpose, are violations of the Commerce Clause.1 93 The Court has
made it unequivocally clear that a finding of protectionist purpose,
motivation, or effect, upon evidence derived from a variety of
sources, is fatal. 19 4 Local programs or revenue-enhancing measures
that evidence protectionism are invalid, even if they neither facially
discriminate nor impose, in fact, a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce.

195

Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980) (remanded dismissal of antitrust
complaint regarding price fixing allegation; case involved fixed rates on brokerage
commissions; court referred to Goldfarb and held that whatever stimulates or
retards residential sales affects demand for financing and title insurance, and that
those two commercial activities are in interstate commerce); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (held unconstitutional minimum fee schedule for
lawyers involved in real estate sales; fee schedule was "interstate commerce" because portion of funds for purchasing of homes came from loans guaranteed by
Federal agencies); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Court applied
Tide II to "Ollie's Barbecue," family owned restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama,
because Ollie's had purchased meat from supplier that had received it from out-ofstate sources); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (since places of public accommodation use products that have moved in
interstate commerce, statute is within Commerce Clause power).
Cf Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985) (federal enforcement against
arson); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (loansharking may be controlled even though activity does not involve interstate activity); United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) (carjackings appropriate subject of federal enforcement, even if offense occured wholly within one state).
192. Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978). For a comprehensive, and still valuable, review of the justifications for inquiry into protectionist
motive, seeJames F. Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause of the
New Federalism: The Case of DiscriminatoryState Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax
Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1978). See also Christine M. Fixi, Hazardous
Waste and PartialImport Bans: An Environmentally Sound Exception to the Commerce
Clause, 3 ViLE. ENvrL. L.J. 149 (1992).
193. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 685 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring). See also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
194. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (invalidating a Connecticut beer pricing affirmation statute as 'just the kind of competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was meant to
preclude").
195. See, e.g., Bradley v. Public Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933); Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315 (1927).
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Invalid statutes, laws, regulations, or other measures typically
indicate some legislative intent to protect certain parties. As one
commentator noted, the Supreme Court's "focus, in practice, prohibits laws motivated by protectionist sentiments or a desire to enrich citizens at the expense of outsiders." 196 Another commentator
concluded that the Commerce Clause essentially constitutes "a
check against the [mere] possibility of covert protectionism."1 97 Professor Donald H. Regan, the author of an oft-cited and extensive
article on Commerce Clause jurisprudence, opined that "in the
central area of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence . . .the

Court has been concerned exclusively with preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism."1 9 8
The decision in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission is
illustrative of the judicial practice of striking down measures that,
while seemingly neutral, were designed to accomplish a protectionist objective.1 9 9 There, the Court addressed the legality of a New
York State transfer tax on the sale of securities. 20 0 The purpose of
the tax, to insulate the New York Stock Exchange and other in-state
exchanges from out-of-state competition, was clear. 20 1 The Court,
looking no further, unanimously concluded that the statute violated the "fundamental principle" that no state or locality may seek
to restrict the effects of free trade

-

20 2
directly or indirectly.

A North Carolina statute governing the labeling of apples was
likewise invalidated because of its protectionist purpose.2 0 3 The
legislation did not seek to categorize apples on the basis of their
196. Gergen, supra note 62, at 1102.

197. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1707 (1984) (emphasis added). See also Michael A. Abbey, Note, State Plant
Closing Legislation: A ModernJustificationfor the Use of the Dormant Commerce Clause as
a Bulwark of NationalFree Trade, 75 VA. L. REv. 845, 877 (1989); Ward A. Greenberg,
Note, Liquor PriceAffirmation Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 186 (1987); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under
42 U.S.C. Section 1983: Protecting the Right to Be Free of Protectionist State Action, 86
MICH. L. REv. 157 (1987).

198. Regan, supra note 31, at 1092 (emphasis added). See also CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (concluding that Indiana Control Shares
Acquisition Act did not contravene Commerce Clause, Court stated that "[t]he
principal objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce," i.e., laws and regulations that evidence protectionist intent).
199. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Hunt

319.
321, 325-26.
329.
v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-54

(1977).
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state of origin.2 0 4 The Court found, however, that despite the neutral language used in the legislation, the purpose of the statute was
to protect in-state farmers, who were the driving force behind the
enactment of the law.20 5 The Court utilized evidence of discriminatory intent from a variety of sources, including legislative history, as
justification for application of the per se analysis, and accordingly
20 6
invalidated the legislation.
"Economic flow control" is an aptly named, but questionable,
concept. Quite simply, it frequently achieves flow control in the
same manner as an ordinance that compels, under threat of sanctions, the delivery of waste to a designated facility - with the same
constitutional result. Similarly, franchise programs, unless created
and implemented so as to promote hauler involvement in the development process, through a fair and open process of negotiations,
and a non-coerced willingness by haulers to deliver wastes, are simply Carbone-type measures in disguise.
IX.

FLOW CONTROL RESULTING FROM FRANCHISES OR CONTRACTS

If purely "economic" flow control arrangements violate the
Commerce Clause, it is possible that mandates requiring a franchisee to take waste to a particular facility are violative as well. Yet,
in SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown,2 0 7 the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit, while finding that a flow control ordinance violated the United States Constitution, upheld a garbage
hauling contract modeled after the ordinance pursuant to the market participant doctrine. 20 8 The court reversed the district court's
decision which had invalidated portions of a collection contract
209
that required the disposal of waste at a particular facility.

204. Id. at 349.
205. Id. at 352-53. Some commenters have questioned whether courts should
employ "protectionist" reasoning in evaluating dormant Commerce Clause claims.
See, e.g., Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination in
Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REv. 381 (1995).
206. Washington Apple, 432 U.S. at 348-54.
207. 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 26762
(Feb. 20, 1996). See Smithtown Flow Control Ruling Upheld by Supreme Court, SOLID
WASTE REP., Feb. 22, 1996, at 59; Courts Might Settle Flow Control Issue Before Congress
Can Pass Oxley Bill, SOLID WASTE REP., Nov. 2, 1995, at 345.

208. Id. at 505-06.
209. Id. at 506. Smithtown enacted, in 1991, an ordinance that provided that
"[n]o person authorized to collect or transport acceptable waste within the Town
of Smithtown shall dispose of acceptable waste generated within the Town of
Smithtown except at a solid waste management facility designated by the Town
Board pursuant to this section." Id. at 507. The plaintiff did not challenge the
city's ability to create districts for the purpose of contracting for solid waste collection services, but did contest the city's contract requirement that the hauler bring
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its garbage to a designated waste disposal facility. Id. at 508 n.15. The court had
little difficulty concluding that the ordinance was, in light of Carbone,unconstitutional. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 513-14. The court, however, reached a different conclusion regarding a waste collection contract that resulted from a solicitation of
competitive bids in 1991. Id. at 516. The bidders were required to sign a "standard
form contract" that obligated them "to dispose of residential garbage" at the designated facility. Id. at 507. "Under the terms of the contract, the haulers were required to bring that garbage to the incinerator." Id. at 505.
The ordinance, the court concluded, was not shielded by the market participant doctrine because of the city's ability to impose criminal penalties. Id. at 512.
Although the court found that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restraint on
commerce, it bifurcated the city's actions in implementing the ordinance through
a "generic" contract that required adherence to the contract, finding that the contract was an exercise of municipal participation in the waste management market
pursuant to the market participant doctrine. SSC Corp., 66 F.3d at 506. In so holding, the court rejected the reasoning of the Waste Recycling court that contracts that
are utilized to implement a flow control ordinance are uniformly subject to the
dormant Commerce Clause, by placing particular emphasis upon the manner in
which the plaintiff's successful bid had itemized "disposal" and "collection"
charges. Id. at 516. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The court emphasized the specific financing arrangement that undergirded the contract, finding
that:
Because Smithtown pays the disposal portion of the bid to reimburse
SSC for tipping fees at the Huntington incinerator, the disposal costs are
'passed through' SSC to town residents - who ultimately foot the bill for
disposal through user fees assessed on their annual property tax bill....
That SSC pays tipping fees to the incinerator does not detract from the
reality that Smithtown is the one consuming-and ultimately paying
for-those disposal services.
Id. at 515.
In addition, the court suggested that the market participant doctrine is not
restricted to situations in which the municipality acts exclusively as a participant,
while acknowledging that the opinion ought not be read broadly:
That Smithtown has favored itself, rather that some private company,
as the provider of disposal services does not affect our analysis. As discussed earlier, it is true that Smithtown "participates" in the waste disposal market not only as a buyer of disposal services from SSC, but also as a
buyer of services from [the incinerator operator] and a re-seller of those
services to SSC. But while these latter two forms of doing business may
constitute "market participation" on the part of Smithtown, they do not
necessarily determine whether another town action - buying disposal
services through the improvement contract - also constitutes market
participation. Smithtown could not force SSC or anyone else to do business with the town as a seller of disposal services at the Huntington incinerator, without resorting to its police powers - and thereby acting as a
market regulator. But because Smithtown is substantially the buyer (and
consumer) of those services, it can dictate by contract where SSC must
purchase the waste disposal services provided to the town.
Id. at 516-17.
The reach of the decision will, of course, be determined in subsequent rulings
of courts within the Second Circuit. Whether courts in other circuits, particularly
those that have traditionally looked askance at the market participant doctrine,
follow the court's reasoning is an open question. The court's reliance upon a
liberal interpretation of White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204 (1983), is arguably inconsistent with the notion that governments
should not be able to utilize the market participant doctrine as a "subterfuge to
regulate the activities of other markets" and non-governmental entities. Ann B.
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Carbone did not specifically address the fate of franchise arrangements and contracts between municipalities and private service providers, and the franchise laws vary considerably from state
to state. Nonetheless, an argument can be made that the conditioning of franchise awards upon the franchisee's "agreement" to utilize
a particular facility may be impermissible. The decision that would
likely be advanced in opposition to a Commerce Clause claim is
CaliforniaReduction Company v. SanitaryReduction Works. 2 10 This case
involved a grant, to the California Reduction Company, of a fifty
Rodgers, The Limits on State Activity in the Interstate Water Market, 21 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 357, 364 n.35 (1986).
Similarly, the interpretation of White by the Second Circuit seems at odds with
the long-held maxim that coercive measures should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) ("The power to confer
or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy ....
This is coercion by economic pressure."). See also New Orleans S.S. Assoc. v. Plaquemines
Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1989); Annjanine
Freeman, Note, White v. Massachusetts Council of ConstructionEmployers, Inc.: State or
Local Governments Acting as Market ParticipantsAre Not Subject to Commerce Clause Restraints, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 217, 222-23 (1984) (arguing that White was based on
"cursory" and .superficial examination of market participant doctrine); Richard
Raskin, Note, ConstitutionalLaw - Commerce Clause - A Mayor's Executive Order
Requiring That At Least Half The Workers On All ConstructionProjectsFinancedIn Whole
Or In Part By City Funds Or FederalFunds That The City Administers Must Be City Residents Does Not Violate The Commerce Clause-white v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 649, 663 (1984) ("White stretches the market
participant exemption to encompass activities that are analogized more aptly to
state regulation than transactions engaged in by private traders."); Adam B. Schiff,
Comment, State DiscriminatoryAction Against Nonresidents: Using the OriginalPosition
Theory as a Frameworkfor Analysis, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 583, 586 (1985) ("[I] f all
state actions characterized as market participation are taken out of the strictures of
the Commerce Clause, then only time prevents the states from structuring many, if
not most, discriminatory actions in the form of market participation.").
Other criticisms of White abound. See, e.g., Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. La. 1995) (questioning
whether doctrine has validity); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97
HARv. L. REv. 70, 75 (1983) (describing Court's analysis as "amorphous" and "ad
hoc").
Professor Coenen, a proponent of the doctrine, has likewise described the
outcome in White as "puzzling." Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant
Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395, 467 (1989) (noting
that "[u]nder a commodious reading of White itself, for example, the 'class' of
economic activity exempted from commerce-clause scrutiny might embrace all
purchases [as well as all hirings] by all suppliers [as well as all contractors and
subcontractors] on all state and municipal construction projects"). Coenen asserts
that White should be limited "essentially to cases involving hiring by construction
contractors." Id. at 468. See also Paul S. Kline, Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local
Preferences: A Study of the Market ParticipantDoctrine, 96 DICK. L. REv. 331, 344-46
(1992).
210. 199 U.S. 306 (1905). For an argument that the decision supports
franchise programs that result in flow control mandates, see Eric S. Petersen &
David N. Abramowitz, MunicipalSolid Waste Row Control in the Post-Carbone World,
22 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 361 (1995).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996

45

248

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal,
Vol.JouRNAL
7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art.
1
VILLANOVA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw
[Vol.

VII: p. 203

year exclusive franchise or "privilege" (contract) to dispose of garbage generated in the City/County of San Francisco at a designated
incinerator to be built within two years of the franchise award. 21'
The franchisee had the right to collect fees from haulers, and received no compensation from the city. 2 12 All generated waste was
directed to the designated facility. 213 Violations were punishable by

fines and imprisonment. 21 4 In several respects, the ordinance
which established the system was more restrictive than that of the
city of Clarkstown, in the Carbone case. The court, however, upheld
the system, rejecting a takings claim by referring to the police
power of the city to regulate garbage collection in order to ensure
2 15
protection of the public health.
In another cage, the Second Circuit refused to interfere with a
waste collection contract in USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon,
New York.216 Citing CaliforniaReduction, the court found that a five

year service arrangement with a private hauler, which allowed the
hauler to "dispose of up to 96,000 tons of garbage per year at the
Incinerator and unlimited amounts of recyclable material at the
town recycling facility, all at no charge," 2 17 was valid. 218 The court
refused to immunize the city's "decision to eliminate the commercial garbage collection market" pursuant to the market participant
2 19
doctrine.
211. California Reduction, 199 U.S. at 306-07.
212. Id. at 308-09.
213. Id. at 310.
214. Id. at 309.
215. Id., at 321-23.
216. 66 F.3d 1272 (2d Cir. 1995). SeeJohn T. Acquino, Courts Continue to Find
flow Control Unconstitutional, Unless It's An Alternative, WASTE AGE, Nov. 1995, at 4.
217. 66 F.3d at 1279.
218. Id. at 1292-95.
219. Id. at 1283. The court noted that:
[T]he Town's decision to hire an outside firm to provide services on
the Town's behalf is quite unremarkable. State governments have turned
to the private sector to "contract out" or "outsource" numerous governmental functions, including services in correctional facilities, the management of concessions in public parks, the operation of mental health
facilities, the training of displaced workers, and the operation of toll
roads. The same is true of local governments, including in the field of
waste disposal. As environmental regulations proliferate, towns may find
that their staffs lack the requisite expertise to provide sanitation services
in compliance with state and local mandates. Such expertise may be more
readily available in the private sector, from firms that specialize in waste
removal.
Id. at 1284 (citation omitted). The opinion described several of the economic advantages of private collection pursuant to contracts or franchise agreements. As
one commentator concluded:
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Moreover, the court stressed that the Town conducted an open
bidding process to award the hauling contractor and "aggressively
solicited proposers from a national audience, by sending out bid
packages to sixty-nine companies across the country, twenty-four of
which were based outside New York."2 20 The court also recognized
that the Town had engaged in other solicitation activities, indicatData on the cost to supply municipal solid waste collection services is
conspicuously absent from the public works literature because most cities
simply do not know what these services cost. Yet clearly, current cost of
service information is essential, if a city wants to make a rational decision
to minimize costs by forming larger markets, changing contract arrangements, or initiating a bidding system.
Numerous studies concur that cities and municipalities providing
waste collection services often do not employ enterprise accounting and
therefore do not know the real costs of solid waste collection or how
these costs may have changed in recent history.
APOGEE RESEARCH, INC., ECONOMIC REGULATION OF THE SOLID WASTE COLLECTION
INDUSTRY: CONSUMER PROTECTION OR INEFFICIENT PUBLIC POLICY? 21 (Jan. 11, 1988)

(citing R.W. BECK AND ASSOC., THE NATION'S PUBLIC WORKS: REPORT ON SOLID
WASTE (Wash., D.C., National Council on Public Works Improvement, May 1987);

E.S. SAVAS, THE ORGANIZATION AND
(1977); RALPH STONE AND CO., INC., A

EFFICIENCY OF SOLID WASTE COLLECTION
STUDY OF SOLID WASTE COLLECTION SYSTEMS

(Wash., D.C., Government Printing
Office, Public Health Service Publication No. 1892, 1969)).
Another writer observed that:
The reasons governments fail to account for costs are numerous.
Many governments do not account for items such as capital costs, interest
on bonds issued to fund services, fuel supply costs, labor costs, and more.
COMPARING ONE-MAN WITH MULTI-MAN CREWS

However, the root cause of such faulty cost accounting rests with the

structure and incentives innate to government bureaucracies. Private
firms must account for costs in order to ensure a profit. In contrast, pub-

lic officials are more likely to focus on an overall budget in where costs
for numerous, and sometimes overlapping, programs may be centralized
into one budget line item or split among many department budgets. Public budgets must also serve a number of political interests.

Angela Logomasini, Municipal Solid Waste Mismanagement: Government Failureand
PrivateAlternatives,J. REG. AND SOC. COSTS. See also E. S. Savas, How Much Do Government Services Really Cost?, 15 URB. AFF. Q. 23 (Sept. 1979); Barbara Stevens, Scale,
Market Structure, and the Cost of Refuse Collection, 59 REv. OF ECON. AND STAT. 432-38
(1978).
Lynn Scarlett of the Reason Foundation recently wrote that:
Garbage rates have also typically been unrelated to actual cost of ser-

vice. In a seminal study of municipal refuse collection, E.S. Savas found
that "public officials themselves are also ignorant of the true cost of a
particular municipal program." In a 1971 study of refuse collection in
New York City, Savas found "that the full cost [of service] was 48 percent
greater than the cost indicated in the city's budget." In subsequent studies of other cities Savas confirmed this finding that municipal budgets
understated service cost by an average of 22 percent.
L. Scarlett, The Garbage Crisis: Air, Water, Earth and People, REASON FOUNDATION,
August 1991, at 45 (citations omitted).
220. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1290.
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ing that there was no protectionist intent. 22 1 The court found, furthermore, that Babylon "did not impose any geographical eligibility
limitations on those who bid to provide collection services in the
District."222 In light of the absence of any evidence that the town
had a protectionist motivation, or that the contracting process was
2 23
flawed, the court rejected the Commerce Clause claim.

221. Id. It had "notified national trade publications of the bidding process,
spoke with representatives of industry trade groups such as the Solid Waste Association of North America, and contacted national waste handling firms by telephone
to generate interest in bidding." Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1294. Curiously, the court, while emphasizing throughout its
lengthy opinion a narrow set of facts, used sweeping language in its conclusion:
This case boils down to two simple propositions. First, towns can
assume exclusive responsibility for the collection and disposal of local
garbage. Second, towns can hire private contractors to provide municipal
services to residents. In neither case does a town discriminate against, or
impose any burden on, interstate commerce. The local interests that are
served by consolidating garbage service in the hands of the town safety, sanitation, reliable garbage service, cheaper service to residents would in any event outweigh any arguable burdens placed on interstate
commerce.
Id. at 1295.
The court's analysis, however, neither justifies such broad language nor explains how the conclusion can be reconciled. For example, a municipality determines that it wishes to flow control waste to a particular facility, creates a contract
for haulers to sign in which the haulers "agree" to provide waste, and threatens
haulers with removal from the jurisdiction unless the contract is signed. In those
cases, admittedly far removed from the facts in USA Recycling, the "threat" might, in
and of itself, be justiciable as an "unconstitutional condition." Professor Sullivan
notes that the "doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether." Kathleen M. Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1989) (emphasis added).
In other words - and Sullivan's point is important - even if the municipality
could otherwise condition the operation of private waste haulers, or exclude them
entirely, it may not take steps that force haulers to forego their ability to engage in
protected commerce in exchange for the "privilege" of doing business.
The right to engage in protected commerce is inherent in the judicial application of the dormant Commerce Clause, and haulers faced with the threat of removal arguably are potentially deprived of a right, which the local government
seeks to force them to exchange "for a valuable privilege which the [City] threatens otherwise to withhold." Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
In Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), the Court stated that:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number
of reasons, there are sound reasons upon which the government may not
rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests.
Id. at 597. See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 516 (1988) (rejecting as
"mischievous proposition of law" claim that "[t]he United States [could] convert
an unconstitutional tax into a constitutional one simply by making the tax conditional. Whether Congress could have imposed the condition by direct regulation
is irrelevant; Congress cannot simply employ unconstitutional means to reach a
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Franchise or contract agreements that are competitively bid,
negotiated, and freely entered into will likely survive a challenge
under the Commerce Clause. It is of considerable importance,
however, that any franchise program, whether exclusive or nonexclusive in nature, avoids conditioning the submission and review of
applications or the execution of a franchise upon the hauler's
agreement to deliver waste to a designated facility. An express or
implied stipulation that only those haulers who agree to flow control-collected waste will be considered, or the inclusion of a flow
control requirement in a franchise agreement in the absence of negotiation and good-faith bargaining would likely contravene the
Commerce Clause. Such a "franchise" program would, for all practical purposes, be a licensing scheme indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Carbone.
constitutional end."); Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state requirement that person be disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits if he or she failed to accept work without good cause;
plaintiff was denied benefits after failed to accept job in munitions factory due to
religious objections to war); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits cannot be conditioned on waiver of procedural due process rights); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state law that deterred influx of poor people for
welfare benefits was impermissible because it chilled exercise of constitutional
right to travel); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that Free
Exercise Clause bars conditioning of unemployment benefits on agreement to
work on Sabbath and noting that "not only is it apparent that appellant's declared
ineligibility derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon
her to forego that practice is unmistakable"); Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (first amendment bars conditioning of tax exemption on showing that taxpayer had not engaged in subversive advocacy); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936) (Court struck down part of Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which
subsidized farmers who reduced their crop production; refusal meant loss of benefits, and noted that legislation was "coercion by economic pressure," and that "asserted power of choice is illusory"); Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.
1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidated federal legislation
that conditioned appropriations to District of Columbia on local incorporation of
certain federal legislation and finding that federal law impermissibly "coerces
[D.C.] Council members' votes on a particular piece of legislation, and because
none of the interests asserted .

.

. justify the abridgement of ...

members' free

speech rights," measure was unconstitutional). Justice Holmes in Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918), noted that "[a]cts generally lawful may
become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end, and a constitutional
power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result."
Sullivan calls for strict judicial scrutiny of "any government benefit condition
whose primary purpose is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise of
a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by government." Sullivan,
supra at 1499-1500. In rare instances, the hauler is presented with, essentially, a
Hobson's Choice-take the "benefit" of being allowed to do business in the city,
but with the inability to exercise a right to engage in otherwise protected commerce. See also Courts May Settle flow Control Issue Before Congress Can Pass Oxley Bill,
SOLID WASTE REP., Nov. 2, 1995, at 345 (quoting criticisms of decisions in Babylon
and Smithtown).
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It is unlikely that federal courts will view inappropriately conceived or executed franchising arrangements as acceptable exercises of the "police power" in light of Carbone for several reasons.
First, the CaliforniaReduction decision was issued well before the ascendancy of modern Commerce Clause analysis. The case was recently mentioned in the dissenting opinion in Carbone2 24 and, with
regard to a "takings" issue, in a decision issued by the Maine
Supreme Court,2 2 5 but not squarely with regard to the relationship

between franchising or municipal contracting and flow control.
The decision was obviously known to the Court, although the majority opinion did not mention it, just as it did not mention prior
flow control decisions.
Second, Commerce Clause issues were never raised in the California Reduction litigation. At the time there was no real likelihood
that San Francisco wastes could be managed at an out-of-state (or,
for that matter, an Oakland) facility. The case really dealt with the
issue of whether the franchise resulted in a taking or violated the
14th Amendment's due process clause. 22 6 At best, the decision currently stands for the simple proposition that, to the extent that provisions do not violate other constitutional guarantees, local
regulations may grant or create monopolies with respect to public
services that are accomplished wholly within the jurisdiction.
Third, the standard utilized for review in CaliforniaReduction "if a regulation enacted by competent public authority avowedly
for the protection of the public health has a real, substantial relation to that object, the courts will not strike it down merely on
grounds of public policy or expediency" 227 - is not the standard
used to evaluate claims under the Commerce Clause. The Court, in
CaliforniaReduction, used a highly deferential standard, finding that
the police power was broad. 22 8 In modern cases, however, the
Court has squarely held that the police power cannot legitimize a
229
local measure that interferes with protected commerce.
Fourth, recent decisions, as noted above, have strongly suggested that certain "economic flow control" measures (e.g., when
224. 114 S. Ct. at 1697, n.10.
225. City of Auburn v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc., 630 A.2d 227, 232 (Me. 1993).
226. See also Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (dealing with Detroit

scheme).
227. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works of San Francisco,

119 S. Ct. 306, 318-19 (1995).
228. Id. at 324-25. The police power encompasses the acknowledged ability to
regulate haulers, avoid nuisances, and provide for safety.
229. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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the community lowers the tipping fee at the public landfill and institutes a "generator fee" or user fee to make up for the potential
revenue loss) may be unconstitutional. If purely "economic" flow
control arrangements violate the Commerce Clause, surely mandates that a hauler obtain a "franchise" or "license" that is at least
implicitly conditioned on flow control would be unconstitutional as
well.
Finally, and importantly, courts are likely to seriously question
"franchise" programs that involve public declarations of intent to
ensure that a facility or system is utilized or evidence economic coercion. If the local government's position regarding the terms of a
franchise agreement - specifically, with regard to the delivery of
collected waste or recyclables - is essentially nonnegotiable, the
resulting process is essentially identical to flow control mandates
created by ordinances. Unlike some franchise arrangements, in
which the award is either for collection only and the hauler may
choose the collection site, or combined collection/disposal
franchises in which the hauler and community may negotiate which
disposal site(s) is utilized, if the franchisee essentially has "no
choice," the Commerce Clause may be violated.
A franchise or economic flow control system may present additional constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court has long held
that a state or local statute, ordinance, or regulation, pursuant to
the Contract Clause of the Constitution, 230 may not impair "the obligations of Contracts."2 3 1 Although the Court has held that this
proscription against impairing the obligation of contracts should
not be interpreted literally, 23 2 when a state or local requirement

promotes a "substantial impairment of a contractual relationship,"23 3 the impairment must be both necessary and reasonably

23 4
designed to promote a valid public purpose.
Flow control requirements, whether direct or indirect, may seriously impair existing contractual obligations between an affected
party and others. The Supreme Court has never insisted that contract rights be completely destroyed, rather, its decisions refer to

230. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl.1.
231. Id. See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819)
(statute cannot effectively prohibit or impair implementation of contract in existence as of time of passage of requirement).
232. Keystone Bituminious Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502
(1987).
233. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
234. See also Energy Reserve Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
411 (1983); United States Trust Co. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S. 1, 28-32 (1977).
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"substantial impairment." 23 5 Since several courts have held, in the
context of Commerce Clause claims, that such measures are not
"necessary" to advance a legitimate public purpose (i.e., less discriminatory measures are available), a court might well find that the
measure is not immune from Contract Clause scrutiny. The undisputed aim of many flow control measures is to ensure the economic
viability of a facility or entity, rather than to promote a "legitimate"
goal such as environmental protection. Accordingly, the impairment of contractual interests that could result would arguably be
without a legitimate public purpose and, accordingly, contrary to
23 6
the Contract Clause.
The very purpose of many flow control requirements and programs is to compel (i.e., monopolize) all solid waste within the jurisdictional limits to be disposed of at a particular facility or facilities.
Such actions may, particularly in the absence of any state statutory
23 7
authorization for flow control, contravene the Sherman Act.

Franchise-facilitated flow control requirements might also constitute improper "tying" arrangements by conditioning the grant of
the franchise upon the requirement that waste be delivered to one
or more designated facilities. Generally, three elements must be
shown to establish the existence of a per se illegal arrangement: (1)
the tying of two distinct items, products, or services; (2) sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying item to appreciably restrain competition in the market for the tied product; and (3) an
effect on a non-insubstantial amount of commerce. 238 A program
that ties together two distinct items - the hauler's franchise and
the use of the disposal or other waste services afforded by the city's
facilities - could satisfy the first element of the test. The power to
235. Allied Structural Steel 438 U.S. at 244.
236. See, e.g., Waste Recycling v. Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal
Auth., 29 F.3d 641 (11th Cir. 1994) (flow control requirement, even when devel-

oped in accordance with state solid waste management rules, cannot be justified by
demonstration that measure is economically necessary or beneficial); Waste Sys.
Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Stephen D.

DeVito, Jr. Trucking v. RISWMC, 770 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.R.I. 1991) (same).
In Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of
Envtl. Resources, 645 A.2d 413, 422 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), the Commonwealth
Court held that contracts entered into before the effective enactment of the discriminatory county ordinances were protected by the Contract Clause. The court
also referred to the Pennsylvania Contract clause, PA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (Purdon
Supp. 1991). See also First National Bank of Pennsylvania v. Flannagan, 528 A.2d
134 (1987).

237. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1996). See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (monopoly power is ability "to control prices
or exclude competition").
238. See, e.g.,Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 446 U.S. 2 (1984).
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franchise waste haulers could be viewed as akin to that of the owner
of a patent or trademark who issues licenses only on the condition
that other goods or services of the owner be purchased. Such arrangements have long been held to violate the federal Sherman
Act. 23 9 It is irrelevant that waste haulers' franchises are not "sold"

240
in the typical commercial sense for antitrust purposes.
The second factor, sufficient economic power in the market
for the tied item, also may be present. The locality might seek to
exercise absolute economic power over the issuance or denial of a
franchise. The resulting restraint in the market for the tied item,
(i.e., waste management facility services), could be significant. At
the same time, a not insubstantial amount of commerce may be
effectively foreclosed from competition. Such programs, therefore,
by conditioning the grant of a waste hauler's franchise upon use of
particular facilities, may establish an illegal tying arrangement.
Such a "franchise" program, a process that is essentially identical in
effect to a licensing requirement, could deny competitors free access to the waste services market in the community, force franchisees to forego their choice of alternative management facilities, and
result in the elimination of competition in the waste services area
with respect to waste generated within local governmental limits.
Restraints of trade, controls upon entry into the marketplace,
and use of monopoly power have traditionally represented classic
prohibited conduct.24 1 There would be little doubt that such conduct, if engaged in by a private party, would likely violate federal

and comparable state antitrust laws. 242 Competitively-bid franchises

and contracts will likely survive judicial dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny; however, "franchises" that are really one-sided licensing re239. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
240. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
392 n.4 (1978).
241. See, e.g., United States. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
242. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948) (anticompetitive behavior that
forecloses competition or eliminates existing competition violates Sherman Act);
DeFino v. Civic Center Corp., 718 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. App. 1986).
Assuming that the activity by the local government is not otherwise beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws, a finding that the entity is a market participant, rather
than a regulator, might subject the entity to antitrust liability. In City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991), the Court stated that,
"with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state
action is 'ipso facto ... exempt from operation of the antitrust laws.' " Id. (quoting
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984)).
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quirements in disguise, and contracts that result from an uncompetitive bidding process, may not.
Instead of relying upon antiquated notions of police power
and controversial applications of the market participant doctrine,
the Second Circuit would have likely reached the same result,
through a reasoned application of Carbone, by applying the standard developed by the Third Circuit in the consolidated Harvey &
Harvey litigation. 243 There, the court, despite having the benefit of
the Second Circuit's decisions neither mentioned the Second Circuit's rulings nor otherwise referred to either the police power standard or the market participant doctrine. In evaluating the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania flow control designation programs
that resulted, in some cases, in the selection of a single facility (and
which frequently involved contracts between the county and the
designated facility or facilities), the court held that the appropriate
standard is whether "the selection process was open and competitive and offered truly equal opportunities to in and out-of-state
24 4
businesses.'
X.

TEST APPLICABLE UNDER "PER SE INVALIDITY' DOCTRINE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THERE

Is A LESS

DISCRIMINATORY

ALTERNATIVE

Under the per se invalidity test, once it is determined that the
standard of review is applicable because a state measure discriminates against protected commerce either on its face or in practical
effect, the burdens of proof and persuasion shift to the defendant.
The defendant must demonstrate that the measure both serves a
legitimate state purpose and is the least discriminatory alternative
to achieve local goals. The Supreme Court has held that the profer2 45
red justification must be subjected to the "strictest scrutiny."
243. Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. County of Chester, 68 F.3d 788 (3d Cir. 1995).

244. Id. at 802.
245. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337. Professor Smith has summa-

rized the test as follows:
It is settled Supreme Court doctrine that if a regulation is discriminatory, the state bears the burden ofjustifying it. First, the state must prove
that it has a legitimate interest to be served by the regulation. Second, it
must show that the regulation serves this interest to a substantial extent.
Third, it must prove that it has no available alternatives to the regulation

that are less discriminatory. Uncertainty in the record on these points, particularly the latter two, is resolved against the state. The state- is excused from its
burden of proof only if Congress has consented to the discrimination,
which rarely occurs.
Smith, supra note 6, at 1231 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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In SouthcentralPennsylvania Waste Haulers Association v. BedfordFulton-HuntingdonSolid Waste Authority,24 6 the court concluded that
it should look at alternatives available both at the time the flow control ordinance was adopted as well as the present. The court also
noted that it must look for alternatives which would allow the landfill (the flow-controlled facility operated by the defendant counties)
to continue to be operational on finance, without the assistance of
flow control ordinances.2 47 Chief Judge Rambo noted that since
the counties were predominately rural and relatively poor, a tax for
248
expansion of the landfill would not have been reasonable.
The court's reasoning is arguably inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's mandate that, when the per se invalidity test is
applicable, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is virtually assured.
The court addressed the issue on second cross motions for summary judgment. It had little difficulty concluding that flow control
ordinances enacted by Bedford, Fulton, and Huntingdon counties
246. Southcentral Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., No. 1:CV-93-1318 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 1995). The court
previously denied the plaintiff's first motion for summary judgment on similar
bases. Southcentral Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Ass'n v. Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste Auth., 877 F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
247. SoathcentralPennsylvania Waste HaulersAss'n, No. 1:CV-93-1318, slip op. at
14.
248. Id. at 15. The court described the development of flow control in the
three counties:
To comply with Act 101, the counties of Bedford, Fulton and Huntingdon developed a municipal waste management plan. Under the counties' plan, all waste generated within the tri-county area must be disposed
of at landfills operated by the Bedford-Fulton-Huntingdon Solid Waste
Authority ("the Authority"). After conducting extensive research, includ-

ing holding public hearings, the counties determined that the Authority
would expand and renovate the existing Bedford landfill to meet Act 101
requirements. It is disputed whether the renovation and connected flow
control ordinances was the only feasible alternatives available to the counties at the time that option was selected.
The Bedford landfill renovation project was financed through a loan
from the Farmer's Home Administration ("FmHA"). On more than one
occasion, Defendants' and their financial expert, John Finley, have commented on the significance of the FmHA loan. The FmHA is widely recognized as lender of last resort. Defendants qualified for a FmHA poverty
line interest rate "because the median household incomes of each of the
Sponsoring Counties was lower than 80% of the Pennsylvania non-metropolitan median household income as defined by FmHA." Despite their
status as poverty line loan recipients, however, the counties had to provide the FmHA with some indication that they were capable of servicing
the loan on a long-term basis.
The counties enacted the flow control ordinances to assist them first
in securing the FmHA loan, and then in servicing the debt. The ordinances require that all waste generated within the tri-county area be sent
to an Authority landfill for disposal.
Id. at 3-4.
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to facilitate the municipal solid waste plan developed by the counties pursuant to the Pennsylvania Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act (Act 101),249 were subject to the
per se invalidity test.2 50 The court determined, however, that it
must examine both the existence of presently available alternatives,
and whether the flow control ordinances were the least restrictive
alternatives available to the counties at the time of their adoption. 2 5 1 The court reasoned that, with regard to the issue of
whether an "available alternative" should be evaluated from the
perspective of hindsight, or through an examination of present-day
options, no clear precedent existed. 252 The Southcentral court first
examined the plaintiffs' contentions that there may have been alternatives when the ordinance was enacted.2 5 3 In rejecting the contention that a general tax increase could have been implemented in
order to expand the publicly owned facility, the court reasoned that
"'reasonable' must be construed to mean 'affordable.' ",254
The per se test, however, requires the shifting of the burdens
of proof and persuasion to the defendant regardless of the status of
the plaintiff as a movant. The defendant's proffered justification
must be subject to the strictest scrutiny,2 55 and the Supreme Court
has unmistakably declared that "[w] hen a state statute... discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor instate economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have gener249. 53

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4000.101-.1904 (Supp. 1995).
250. Id. at 8-10. The court stressed that it found "unconvincing Defendants'

argument that Atlantic Coast Demolition militates in favor of the application of the
Pike balancing test to the instant facts." Id. at 10.
In expressly endorsing Carbone and expressly rejecting Filiberto, the Third Circuit confirmed this court's belief that strict scrutiny review is required." Id.

251. Id. at 14.
252. Id. at 13. The court concluded that:
The outcome of the instant action will be driven by the way this court
defines the alternatives inquiry. Accordingly, the court finds it prudent

to examine all alternatives-those available at the time flow control ordinances were enacted, and those presently available. The court will first
examine whether nondiscriminatory alternatives existed at the time the
ordinances were enacted. Should the court find that such alternatives
did exist, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Plaintiffs. If,
however, the court finds that no non-discriminatory alternatives existed

then, the court will examine whether such alternatives exist today. Finally, if the court finds that such alternatives are presently available, the

court will examine whether it is reasonable to require Defendants to implement those alternatives.
Id. at 14.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 15.
255. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977).
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259

ally struck down the statute without further inquiry."2 56 The
Supreme Court's standard is an exacting one for a good reason discriminatory activity should not be fostered and the free market
principles advanced by the dormant Commerce Clause ought not
be diminished through concerns about the economic viability of a
particular alternative. The Court's standard is not one of making
certain that the defendant's economic condition is unaffected by
the removal of a discriminatory law or regulation. The reality is
that a non-discriminatory alternative almost always exists, and the
Court has never insisted that relief be granted only when an alter25 7
native appears to be both "reasonable" and "affordable."
Likewise, the Southcentral court arguably erred in its examination of present day non-discriminatory alternatives. It insisted that
any alternative must "allow the landfill to continue to be operational and financed, but without the assistance of flow control." 258
The court rejected plaintiffs' demonstration that a surplus of landfill capacity existed in the region, arguing that "[t]he issue is not
simply whether other landfill space is available; but whether the
counties can finance any of the suggested alternatives."2 5 9 The
court determined that any advanced alternative had to ensure that
the counties could "continue to support the debt" that had been
secured through the discriminatory flow control ordinances. 2 60 Accordingly, while the court was quick to apply the more stringent
standard of dormant Commerce Clause review in light of the clearly
discriminatory nature of the flow control mandates, it was apparently unwilling, at least pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, to strike down the ordinances if the defendants would be
adversely affected. The court denied the parties' cross motions,
finding that "material factual disputes remain as to whether economically feasible alternatives are presently available to the
26 1
counties.
Through the application of a standard that seeks to ensure the
continued economic viability of a facility that was designed, constructed, and operated pursuant to a discriminatory program, the
256. Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986).
257. Id. One option that was apparently not advanced or considered was the
privitization of the Bedford landfill, with the landfill acting as a participant in an
open market for the disposal of waste.
258. SouthcentralPennsylvania Waste HaulersAss'n, No. 1:CV-93-1318, slip op. at
17.
259. Id.
260. Id.

261. Id. at 18.
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Southcentralcourt seemingly minimized the effect of the discrimination on the plaintiffs (and the residents of the counties) by refusing
to endorse a remedy that would leave .the defendants less than
whole. Such an approach could sanction, rather than minimize,
discriminatory behavior, and institutionalize long-term discrimination simply because economic regimes have been created and fostered by constitutionally questionable activity.
The United States Supreme Court's decisions do not suggest
that the "per se invalidity" standard should be employed in a manner in which a clearly discriminatory measure may be less likely to
be invalidated than one evaluated pursuant to the Pike "balancing"
test. Moreover, no decision of the Court has suggested that defendants in "per se" cases must be protected from the economic consequences that may follow from the invalidation of an
unconstitutional law or regulation. The Southcentralcourt's reasoning is, therefore, inconsistent with the determination in Carbone
that the existence of a financial obligation is evidence of economic
protectionism, rather than a justification for a more deferential
standard of review.
The Commerce Clause does not simply protect economic actors in instances in which the avoidance of discrimination is economically advantageous to the defendant or of no economic
import. Instead, the Commerce Clause serves an important - indeed, irreplaceable - function as a mandate for economic cooperation and unification. As the United States Supreme Court noted
in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 2 6 2 "[i]t would be difficult to overstate the breadth and depth of the commerce power. It is not the
vastness of this power, however, that is so important here; it is its
effect on the power of the States." 263 Justice Cardozo also declared
that "[t] he Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run, prosperity and salvation are in union and
not division." 2 64 In order to ensure that the principles behind the
Commerce Clause are given effect, courts must be willing to invali262. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
263. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
264. Baldwin v. GA.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). See also H.P
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) ("[O]ur economic unit is
the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control the economy;" concluding that New York could not restrict milk exports in effort to protect
residents from price increases).
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date measures that are discriminatory or evidence economic protectionism, by applying a strict burden of proof and persuasion.
XI.

CONCLUSION

The Commerce Clause acts as an obstacle to anticompetitive
barriers to the movement of solid waste that are not specifically authorized by Congress. Carbone is simply the latest in a series of decisions that have questioned measures that seek to "hoard" waste
volumes or to exclude non-local wastes. Through consistent application of the principles that underlie the Commerce Clause, courts
can ensure that the goals of the founding fathers are promoted and
that a national market for waste services is fostered.
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